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INTRODUCTION
In the jungles of Suriname, government soldiers publicly beat seven
young men of the Saramaca tribe, took them from their village, forced
them to dig their own graves, and then murdered them.' Although
Suriname eventually accepted international responsibility before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for these human rights violations
in the Aloeboetoe Case,2 the Court still had to consider the type and
amount of reparations and to whom they should be awarded. Repara-
tions, which are often complicated by the varying socio-economic
conditions in the Inter-American human rights system, were especially
difficult to determine in the case of the remote Saramaca tribe.3 Al-
though the Inter-American Court's innovative decisions in setting repa-
rations in Aloeboetoe, and in other cases which reflect Third World
conditions, have established important precedents in the area of repara-
tions in international human rights law, significant inequities still exist.
The Court, for example, cannot address the cases of most human rights
victims due to the current procedural organization of the system. More-
over, in two recent cases, the Inter-American Court appears to be rede-
1. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 2-6 (1993).
2. Id. para. 24.
3. The Court had to determine whether to take into account tribal customs, which
violated Surinamese family law, in determining the beneficiaries of the victims. The victims
in this case practiced polygamy, as was customary in their tribe, and all of the wives claimed
to be beneficiaries of the reparations award. Moreover, none of the victims' marriages or the
births of their children had been registered, as was legally required for the status of beneficia-
ries under Surinamese law. The amount of lost earnings was also difficult to prove because,
as is common in nonindustrial economies, the men worked only periodically when and where
they could find employment. Moreover, there were no pay stubs or tax returns to use to
calculate lost wages. Id. para. 88.
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fining its basis of reparations to minimize difficulties in calculating
damages and to establish more definite precedent which may encourage
settlement.4 The Court awards of determinate amounts for particular
types of damages in these cases may, however, result in criticism that
the judgments are arbitrary and do not reflect actual damages.5 This
article seeks to assess the viability of the Inter-American Court's victim
reparations practice and procedure by examining the Court's body of
victim reparations judgments and, where appropriate, by comparing
those judgments with the practice and procedure of the European Court
of Human Rights. The ultimate aim of the article is to suggest new
directions in which the Court should move on this issue to further
influence the progressive development of international human rights law.
It is a basic principle of international law that a State must make
adequate reparation for the harm caused by the breach of its internation-
al obligations.6 The purpose of reparations is twofold: first, to require
States to observe certain standards of law and order; and second, to
repair, to the extent possible, any injuries caused as a result of a State's
failure to meet those standards. 7 A State may incur international obliga-
tions under customary international law or through the ratification of a
treaty. Historically, under the International Law of Injury to Aliens, a
State violated an international obligation to another State when it injured
a citizen of another State. Only a State could sue another State and
4. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 19, 1996), to be
reprinted in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1996
(forthcoming in 1997) [hereinafter THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT];'Neira Alegria Case (Repa-
rations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 19, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996
ANNUAL REPORT, supra.
5. See Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 4 (Sept. 19,
1996) (Dissenting Vote of Judge Ad Hoc Orihuela Ibericao), to be reprinted in THE 1996
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
6. The Factory at Chorz6w (Merits), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13), cited
in VelAsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
25 (1989). "Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a
convention." The Factory at Chorz6w (Jurisdiction), 1927 P.I.C.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July
26).
7. MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-24 (1937).
8. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at
13 (Aug. 30), in which the Permanent Court of International Justice stated:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect
its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by
another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the
ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.
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demand reparation for the injuries inflicted on its citizens. The injured
individual did not have a directly enforceable claim against a State that
violated his rights.9 Moreover, an individual had no international re-
course in the case of a violation by her own government.' 0
Within the last fifty years, States have ratified human rights treaties
that create international obligations owed by the ratifying States to
individuals." If the State violates these obligations, the treaties may
require that the State remedy the violation by making reparations to the
injured party.'2 Most States have ratified treaties under which they have
voluntarily assumed an international obligation to protect human rights
and have granted jurisdiction to international authorities to oversee their
compliance. 13 In the Americas, twenty-five States have ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights. 4 These States Parties to the
9. The Permanent Court of International Justice stated:
The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules of international law in force
between the two States concerned, and not the law governing relations between the
State which has committed a wrongful act and the individual who has suffered
damage.
Factory at Chorzdw (Merits), 1928 P.C.I.J. at 28. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H.
WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN PRACTICE 1 (1982).
10. Only States were considered to be the subjects of international law; an individual was
an object of international law and as such had no formal rights or obligations.
11. See generally Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
12. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, art. 2, 2(3)(a) & 9(5), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 71, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Sept. 3, 1953, art. 50, 213
U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970); African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, art. 21(2), 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) (limited right to a
remedy).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 906 (1990). "Failure to provide such remedies would constitute an additional
violation of the agreement." Id. § 703 cmt. c.
13. Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, States have a duty to comply in good
faith with the international obligations which they have undertaken. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force on
Jan. 27, 1980); see also Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, June
26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055 (providing that when the parties voluntarily accept the
jurisdiction of the Court, the Court shall have competence to decide on the "nature and extent
of reparation").
14. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 693,
OEA/ser.K/XVI/I.1/Doc. 65 (English) Rev. 1. Corr. 2 (1970) (entered into force July 18,
1978) (hereinafter the Convention or the American Convention]. The States that have ratified
the American Convention are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The United States has signed but never ratified the
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Convention have undertaken an international obligation to protect and
ensure the rights delineated in the treaty and to provide reparations to
the injured parties if they violate those rights. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights15 and the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights16 are the international organs charged with the oversight of
State compliance with the American Convention. Should the Commis-
sion find that a State has violated an individual's rights, and that State
does not remedy the violation, the Commission may, when appropriate,
refer the case to the Court.' 7
American Convention. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 1995, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 229, OASISer.L/VIIII.33IDoc. 7 rev. (1996).
15. The Inter-American Commission [hereinafter the Inter-American Commission or the
Commission] is composed of seven commissioners. American Convention, supra note 14, art.
34. The commissioners are chosen from the Member States of the Organization of American
States (OAS) and must be of recognized competence in the field of human rights. Id. art. 36.
No two Commissioners may be nationals of the same State. Id. art. 37. The seat of the
Commission is in Washington D.C.
All complaints *alleging human rights abuses in the Inter-American system must first be
directed to the Inter-American Commission. Id. art. 61(2). See also, In the Matter of Viviana
Gallardo (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am. Ct. HR. Op. No. G101/81 (1981), reprinted in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1981 12,
OEA/Ser.LIII.7, doc.13 (1982). The Commission then determines whether the complaint
meets the American Convention's requirements for admissibility. American Convention, supra
note 14, art. 46. If it does not, the Commission may ask the petitioner for additional informa-
tion. On the other hand, if the complaint is prima facie admissible, the Commission informs
the government involved and requests'pertinent information. Id. art. 48(l)(a). The Commis-
sion may hold hearings on the matter and, if appropriate, attempt to bring about a friendly
settlement. Id. art. 48(1)(e), art. 48(1)(f). If, however, no friendly settlement is reached, the
Commission draws up a report with recommendations and transmits it to the State concerned.
Id. art. 50. Only after the procedures before the Commission have been exhausted can the
case be referred to the Inter-American Court,. and then only if the State involved has express-
ly recognized the Court's jurisdiction. Id. art. 51(1), 62(1). The Commission must appear in
all cases before the Inter-American Court. Id. art. 57.
16. The Inter-American Court [hereinafter the Inter-American Court or the Court] is
composed of seven judges, who are "nationals of the member states of the Organization,
elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of the highest moral authority and of
recognized competence in the field of human rights." American Convention, supra note 14,
art. 52: The judges are elected for a term of six years and may serve no more than two terms.
Id. art. 54. The Court sits part-time, and the seat of the Court is in San Jose, Costa Rica.
Following the conclusion of procedures before the Commission, the State Party or the
Commissio'n can refer a contentious case to the. Court. Id. art. 61. After the parties have
briefed the relevant issues the Court will hold public hearings in the case. In addition to its
contentious jurisdiction, the Court has an advisory jurisdiction. Id. art. 62. Also, in "cases of
extreme gravity and urgency," the Court may order a State to take provisional measures to
protect persons from irreparable harm. Id. art. 63(2).
17. The State Party must have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. Seventeen of the
twenty-five States Parties to the American Convention have accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Inter-American Court. These States Parties are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1995 177-78, OAS/Ser.L/V/III.33/Doc.4 (1996).
Under the American Convention, the Commission and the State Party involved are the
parties to a case. American Convention, supra note 14, art 61(1). The victim, or victim's
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If the Inter-American Court attributes responsibility for the violation
to the State, 18 the Court may then order the State to make reparations to
the individual in accordance with the American Convention. 19 The
American Convention confers on the Inter-American Court a broad
authority to order reparations. 20 The Convention not only authorizes the
Court to order a State to compensate the victim, it also empowers the
Court to order the State to take remedial measures. 2'
The Court has made only limited use of its authority to order reme-
dial measures, in part due to the type of case with which it has repeated-
ly been confronted. Reparations in international law were not developed
to deal with large-scale violations of human rights or situations in which
the government refuses to investigate the abuse or punish the violators.
In the European system, for instance, there have not been cases of
torture, disappearance, or extra-judicial execution, where the state appa-
ratus often has besmirched the good name of the victim, failed to inves-
tigate the crime, and then granted a blanket amnesty to the perpetrators.
The European system is generally confronted by isolated instances of
human rights abuses, not by the gross and systematic abuses which have
plagued the Inter-American system.22
As evidenced in the Aloeboetoe Case, the socio-economic conditions
of many States in the Americas present problems in the area of repara-
family, does not generally have standing before the Inter-American Court. See Jo M.
Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Developing Precedents in Human
Rights Law for Underdeveloped Regions, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297, 316-20
(1994-95) [hereinafter Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System] for a critique
of this provision.
18. The American Convention, as interpreted by the Inter-American Court, establishes
broad bases of State responsibility which are in keeping with general principles of internation-
al law. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case (Merits), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 158
(1988); Godfnez Cruz Case (Merits), 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 165 (1989). Cases in
the Inter-American system exhibit some of the most complex and difficult issues in the
attribution of State responsibility for human rights violations. Often there is evidence of an
official attempt to provide impunity for the State and for those who perpetrated the abuses on
its behalf. The modus operandi of many violations is planned so as to eliminate evidence.
Death squads are composed of unknown assassins, victims may be held in clandestine prisons
and then disappear-their bodies destroyed or buried in common graves, and witnesses are
killed or intimidated into maintaining silence. The Inter-American Court has developed
precedents to curtail the region's predominant problem of de facto and de jure impunity for
human rights violations.. See Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System, supra
note 17, at 326-328.
19. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
20. See infra Section 1.
21. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
22. European cases often involve complaints of violations of "arrest and detention
guarantees and fair administration of justice, and not the chilling and harrowing violations in
other parts of the world." E.V.O. Dankwa, Conference on Regional Systems of Human Rights
Protection in Africa, the Americas and Europe, 13 HuM. RTS. L.J. 314, 316 (1992).
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tions. The poverty and inaccessibility of certain areas complicate the
determination of damages. 23 The prevailing poverty also makes large
awards to certain victims unacceptable when hundreds of other victims
go uncompensated. 24 Social and cultural differences, especially those of
indigenous groups, require cultural sensitivity and the innovative appli-
cation of international law.25 Decisions on reparations made thus far by
the Inter-American Court have made significant inroads in dealing with
the particular socio-economic situations of the region.
Many problems, however, have not yet been successfully resolved.
For instance, although hundreds of individuals may have suffered the
same type of violation in a State during the same general period of time,
under the procedures now in place for case referral, only a few of the
cases can be sent to the Court. Logically, the Court can only order
reparations to be paid to the victims whose cases have come before it.
All other victims generally go uncompensated because the domestic
judicial systems often cannot act.26 The Court has also demonstrated
seemingly discriminatory tendencies in awarding a relatively small part
of the damages to the spouse of the victim, who has to date been the
widow,27 and then in declaring that the larger share of the damages
awarded to the children cannot be used for their basic expenses.28
A study of the reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court,
with relevant comparisons to the European human rights system and the
International Law of Injury to Aliens, is of theoretical and practical
importance for the resolution of these issues. It is relevant to the States
Parties, as it may serve as a deterrent by educating them about the
reparations that they may be publicly ordered to make to the victims; to
23. See generally David J. Padilla, Reparations in Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, 17 HuM. RTS.
Q. 541 (1995).
24. THE PRELIMINARY REPORT ON DISAPPEARANCES OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS: THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES
234 (Human Rights Watch/Americas trans., 1994) (abridged English translation of Los
HECHOS HABLAN POR SI MISMO: INFORME PRELIMINAR SOBRE LOS DESAPARECIDOS EN
HONDURAS 1980-I993 (1994)) [hereinafter HONDURAN REPORT].
25. See Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System, supra note 17, at
329-34.
26. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth Commis-
sions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 321 (1994)[hereinafter Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth] for the explanation that many democratic govern-
ments which take control after regimes or dictatorships do not have the power to prosecute
the perpetrators of human rights violations. Thus, human rights offenders in that State are
granted amnesty. The amnesty often prohibits victims from filing civil cases against the
offenders.
27. To date in the Inter-American Court, reparations have been made only to the families
of male victims.
28. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 106 (1993).
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the individual claimants, who must decide if it is worthwhile to pursue
a claim; to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which
attempts to negotiate friendly settlements between the claimants and the
States and which represents the claimants before the Inter-American
Court; to other human rights systems and domestic courts that may be
confronted by similar types of abuses; and to the Inter-American Court
itself, which should reflect on and clarify its practice in this area.
In order to assist these entities, Part II of this article analyzes the
statutory authority for reparations in the Inter-American system in light
of the legislative history of the American Convention's reparations
provision and compares that authority with that provided for in the
European human rights system. Part III sets forth the Inter-American
Court's procedures for determining reparations once State responsibility
has been established. Part IV evaluates the parties who may receive
reparations. Part V analyzes the types of reparations provided generally
under international law and specifically in the Inter-American system.
Part VI criticizes the Court's determination to grant only a small share
of the reparations to the victim's spouse. Part VII sets forth the method
of payment of Court ordered compensation. Part VIII suggests that the
Court consistently structure its procedural phases to provide for a final,
comprehensive reparations phase. Finally, Part IX outlines .the principles
of the execution of Court-ordered reparations and delineates State com-
pliance to date.
I. INTER-AMERICAN COURT'S AUTHORITY
FOR VICTIM REPARATIONS
Article 63(1) of the American Convention authorizes victim repara-
tion for the violation of a right or freedom protected by the Conven-
tion. 29 This provision prescribes that:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a' right or
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the
injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that
29. American Convention, supra note 14, at art. 63(1). Although there is no formal
statute of limitations which places a limit on the number of years after a violation when a
victim can bring a complaint in the Inter-American system, there is a deadline for the
presentation of the petition. In the Inter-American system, the complainant must file a petition
with the Inter-American Commission within six months of the notification of a final rfiling on
the case at the domestic level. Id. art. 46. Other admissibility requirements provide that
domestic remedies must have been exhausted, the subject of the petition must not be pending
in another international proceeding, the individual petition must include specific identifying
information about the person or entity lodging the complaint. Id. The petition must also state
facts that tend to establish a violation of the human rights protected by the American Conven-
tion. Id. at art. 47.
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was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequenc-
es of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such
right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to
the injured party.30
Article 63(1) codifies the fundamental principle of international law that
"every violation of an international obligation which results in harm
creates a duty to make adequate reparation."''3
The legislative history of Article 63(1) reveals that the drafters
intended by its language to give the Inter-American Court broad powers
to order reparations for the injured party. The original draft of the
reparations provision of the Convention provided for only compensatory
damages. That provision read, "[a]fter it has found that there was a
violation of a right or freedom protected by' this Convention, the Court
shall be competent to determine the amount of compensation to be paid
to the injured party. 32 The Guatemalan representative then successfully
proposed strengthening and expanding the provision. Under the Guate-
malan proposal, if the Court recognized a violation of the Convention, it
could provide "[t]hat the consequences of the decision or measure that
has impaired those rights be stopped; [t]hat the injured party be guaran-
teed the enjoyment of his violated right or freedom, [and t]he payment of
just compensation to the injured party. 33 After the drafting committee's
30. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
31. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 25 (1989) (citing Factory at Chorzow (Jurisdiction), 1927 P.C.I.J. at 21, and Factory at
Chorzow (Merits), 1928 P.C.I.J. at 26); Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 184. The Inter-American Court stated:
It is a principle of international law, which jurisprudence has considered 'even a
general concept of law,' that every violation of an international obligation which
results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation. Compensation, on the
other hand, is the most usual way of doing so.
Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 25
(1989).
32. Draft Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights, art. 52(1),
OEA/Ser.LUII.19Doc. 48 (English) Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1968) reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, Booklet 13, at 1, 20 (Thomas Burgenthal & Robert E. Norris eds.,
1982 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
33. Observations by the Governments of the Member States on the Draft Inter-American
Convention on Protection of Human Rights: Guatemala, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1 .1 Doc. 24 (English)
(Nov. 8, 1969) reprinted in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 32, Booklet 13, at 119, 132.
The Report of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Conference on
Protection of Human Rights stated that the final wording of the provision "represented a
strengthening and expansion of Article 52, paragraph 1, of the Draft Convention, which referred
only to the Court's competence to determine compensation. It was based on a Guatemalan
proposal (Doc. 24, Article 39)." Report of the U.S. Delegation, at 54 reprinted in 3 HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 32, Booklet 15, at i, 54.
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affirmative vote on the Guatemalan proposal, Committee minutes reveal
that it had "approved a text which is broader and more categorically in
defense of the injured party than was the Draft. ' 34 The legislative history
of that particular Committee meeting provides no further explanation of
the reasoning underlying the decision to strengthen the reparations
provision. However, there are statements elsewhere in the legislative
history which indicate that the drafters of the American Convention
intended to enhance the protection of human rights within the unique
circumstances of the Western hemisphere.35 Although the American
Convention is modeled on the United Nations human rights instruments
and the European Convention, the drafters of the American Convention
refused to simply replicate those treaties. Rather, the delegates to the
drafting conference argued that "it was appropriate to introduce any
modifications that were desirable in the light of circumstances prevailing
in the American Republics. 36
As ratified, the American Convention expressly authorizes the Court
to order a State to take measures to remedy the consequences of the
human rights violation. In addition to ordering the State to pay compen-
sation, "the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoy-
ment of his right or freedom that was violated., 37 Thus, if the victim were
alive and in prison, and the Court held that the detention was illegal, the
Court could order the State to free the victim. Also under Article 63(1),
if appropriate, the Court shall rule that "the consequences of the measure
or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be
remedied."38 Thus, the Court could require that the State provide medical
care to a torture victim who continued to suffer health problems as a
result of inhumane treatment.
The Inter-American Court's authority to order reparations under
Article 63(1) is much broader than that of its European counterpart. 39 The
34. Report of Committee 11: Organs of Protection and General Provisions, OEA/Ser.K/
XVI/1.1 Doc. 71 (English) Rev. 1 (Jan. 30, 1970), reprinted in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
32, Booklet 12, at 225, 232. The wording of the provision was later modified slightly.
35. See, e.g., Sydney Liskofksy, Report on the Convention on Human Rights adopted by
Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, reprinted in 3 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 32, Booklet 15, at 87, 88.
36. Council of Europe, Report on the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human
Rights (Strasbourg, Dec. 22, 1969) [hereinafter Council of Europe Report], reprinted in 3
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 32, Booklet 15, at 67, 71.
37. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
38. Id.
39. Council of Europe Report, supra note 36, at 81. See also A. H. ROBERTSON & J. G.
MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 311 (3d ed. 1993).
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corresponding provision of the European Convention, Article 50, autho-
rizes the European Court of Human Rights to "afford just satisfaction to
the injured party" only if necessary.' Consequently, the European Court
of Human Rights has determined that it is limited to ordering financial
compensation: it is not empowered to order a State to take remedial
measures. 41 The European Court has regularly declared that in the
European system, "it is for the State to choose the means to be used in
its domestic legal system to redress the situation that has given rise to the
violation of the Convention. 42 The representative of the Council of
Europe observing the American drafting conference reported on the
reparations provision that "[t]he Inter-American Court of Human Rights
will have considerably wider powers than the European Court. 4 3
The question arises whether the wider powers granted to the Inter-
American Court in the area of reparations include the authority to order
a State to repeal a law that resulted in a human rights violation. As stated,
the American Convention empowers the Court to rule that "the conse-
quences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach" be
remedied." Traditionally, however, those consequences are considered to
be the injuries that have already been caused by the governmental
measure. They do not include those consequences that may possibly be
caused in the future if the law that resulted in the measure continues in
force.45 Under this interpretation, for instance, if the Inter-American Court
were to rule that a domestic law violated the Convention by authorizing
detention without adequate guarantees of due process, reparations would
40. The European Convention provides that,
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other
authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the
obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the said
Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision
or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.
European Convention, supra note 12, art. 50.
41. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 184 (2d. ed. 1990).. See also Montserrat Enrich Mas, Right
to Compensation under Article 50, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 775, 778 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) ("A number of applicants have
requested the Court to annul an internal decision or measure, to issue an injunction and to give
some directions to the respondent State. The Court has answered that it had no jurisdiction to
do so.").
42. Zanghi v. Italy, 194-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 48 (1991).
43. Council of Europe Report, supra 36, at 81; see also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra
note 39, at 311.
44. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
45. 2 FV. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 583
(1984).
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be limited to an order that the victim's prison term be annulled. Article
63(1) would not authorize the Court to order that the State repeal the
offending law. The domestic effect of the Court's ruling that the offend-
ing law does not comply with the State's international legal obligations
under the Convention would then depend upon whether the State con-
cerned adheres to a monistic or dualistic view of international law. 6
The view, presently accepted in international law, that international
treaty obligations may not be self-executing, does not advance the effec-
tive enforcement of human rights. Modern human rights treaties
are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to
accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit
of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection
of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their
nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other
contracting States.47
States accept certain human rights obligations when they ratify these
treaties. The Inter-American Court has clarified that "[i]n concluding these
human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to
a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various
obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals
within their jurisdiction. 4 ' Given this reality, reparations provisions in
human rights treaties, such as Article 63(1), should be interpreted broadly
to allow international courts to require States to alter their laws to comply
with treaty obligations. It is illogical and archaic that a domestic law,
which has been declared in violation of a State's international legal
obligations, would be allowed to remain in force, thereby requiring each
successive victim of that law to pursue a prolonged and costly case before
national tribunals,49 and then within an international human rights system,
to remedy the violation. This current limitation on the power of interna-
tional human rights courts is a remnant of exaggerated state sovereignty.
46. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 41, at 11-12. Thomas Buergenthal Self-Executing
and Non Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law, 235 RECUEIL DES COURS
303 (1992). See also Thomas Buergenthal, International Tribunals and National Courts: The
Internationalization of Domestic Adjudication, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND
BEWAHRUNG 687, 695-99 (Max-Planck 1995) for a discussion of the Argentine Supreme
Court's holding that a particular provision of the American Convention is directly self-
executing in Argentina. Ekmekdjign v. Sofovich, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n 315
Fallos 1492 (1992).
47. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention (Arts.
74 and 75), 2 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 29 (1982) (advisory op.).
48. Id.
49. A victim must first exhaust domestic remedies before he or she may file a complaint
for international relief. See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 46(1)(a).
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In contrast to the situation of human rights courts, the European
Court of Justice has determined that provisions of European Union law
are directly applicable in the member States; regardless of whether the
national legal system provides for a monistic or dualistic approach to
international law.50 Moreover, according to the.European Court of Justice,
these self-executing provisions of European Union law have priority over
all national laws.5' The Court based this determination on the fact that the
States have renounced their sovereign rights in accepting the legal system
of the Union, and on the principle of effectiveness, which holds that
without priority of the international law, that law could not be applied in
a reasonable and useful way. 52 This reasoning is even more applicable
when the subject matter of the laws in question is the protection of
individual human rights.
At this time, the Inter-American Court does not have the consensus
necessary to initiate this development.53 Even changes of lesser import
could presently jeopardize the system. 54 Such a change may need to be
effected through the future development of an economic free-market
which incorporates human rights provisions.
II. INTER-AMERICAN COURT PROCEDURES
IN DETERMINING REPARATIONS
When the Inter-American Court has attributed responsibility to the
State or the State has accepted responsibility for a violation of the
50. VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 41, at 12-13.
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id.
53. Only seventeen of the twenty-five States which have ratified the Convention have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. For a list of States Parties to the Ameri-
can Convention see supra note 17.
In the European human rights system, major changes in the role of the European Court
were not made until all Member States had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Additional Protocols, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 114 (1994). Twenty-seven of the twenty-eight Member
States to the European Convention at that time signed.Protocol 11. Id. at 81 n.1.
54. David Padilla, the former Deputy Secretary of the Inter-American Commission, in
reference to the possibility of giving the individual the power to seize the Court, a move much
less threatening than giving the Court the power to declare that provisions of the American
Convention are directly applicable in the Member States, stated:
I believe it would be imprudent if not downright risky to accelerate and expand the
role of the private actor in the conduct of contentious cases before the Inter-Ameri-
can Court until and unless a substantial majority of the OAS member states are
likely to acquiesce to such changes. Rejection of these developments could jeopar-
dize broader acceptance by reticent member states of the OAS whose participation
in the system is essential for future progress.
David Padilla, The Inter-American Commission, on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States: A Case Study, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 95, 110 (1993).
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Convention, the issue of State reparations to the injured party is then
before the Court.5 If the Court has not specifically determined reparations
in the judgment on the merits, the Court may reserve its decision for
further proceedings. 6 To date, the Court has reserved most decisions on
reparations for a subsequent phase of the proceedings.57
In those cases, the Court has allowed the Commission and the State
Party a period of six months following the judgment on the merits to
agree on reparations." The Court, however, retains jurisdiction over the
case to "verify the fairness of the agreement ' 59 or, should the parties fail
to reach an agreement, to institute the subsequent stage.6 When feasible,
the same judges who decided the merits of the case make the decision as
to reparations and supervise compliance with the Court's judgment. 6' In
no case to date have the Commission and State reached complete agree-
ment during the six month negotiation period.62 This may be due to
limited and conflicting Inter-American case law on reparations. The
parties could not anticipate the Court's award in a given case, and,
consequently, an inadequate basis existed for settlement negotiations.
55. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
56. INTER-AM. CT. H.R. RULES OF PROCEDURE art. 56 [hereinafter RULES OF THE COURT]
(the new Rules of Procedure adopted by the Court at its thirty-fourth session held Sept. 9-20,
1996 are on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law). In the European Court, the
decision on just satisfaction may be made simultaneously with the judgment on the merits of
the case if the Court finds that the issue is ready for decision. If it is not yet ready, the Court
may reserve the decision for a further procedure. See VAN DIUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 41,
at 173.
57. But see the Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 71
(1994), in which the Court determined the amount of damages for the violation of the right to
liberty in the merits phase of the proceedings.
58. Neira Alegria Case (Merits), 20 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 91(4) (1995); El
Amparo Case (Merits), 19 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) res. 3 (1995); Aloeboetoe Case (Merits),
11 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) res. 2 (1991); Velisquez Rodrfguez Case (Merits), 4 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 194(6) (1988).
59. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 56. In the Maqueda Case against Argentina,
the parties reached a friendly settlement after the case was referred to the Court but before the
Court reached the merits of the case. In accordance with the previous Article 43(2) of the Rules
of the Court, the Court then reviewed and approved the settlement before it struck the case off
its docket. Maqueda Case, 18 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras. 24-27 (1995).
60. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case (Merits), 22 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
72(7) (1995); Godfnez Cruz Case (Merits), 5 Inter-A. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 203(6) (1989);
VelAsquez Rodriguez Case (Merits), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 194(6) (1988).
61. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 19, 1995 reprinted
in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1995 129 (1996).("[A]II issues related to a decision on reparations and compensation, and to the supervision of
compliance with this Court's judgments, fall to the judges who served on the Court at the time
the Court decided those matters, unless a public hearing has already taken place, in which case
the judges that were present at that hearing will decide the issue.")
62. The only formal partial agreement came in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Compensa-
tory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 5 (1989), in which the parties were able to
agree on the beneficiaries.
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Perhaps as a result, the Commission has often requested damages that are
much higher than those actually awarded by the Court63 and the States
have offered far less.64 In its most recent decisions, however, the Court
has more clearly defined the criteria it will use when determining damag-
es. 65 This greater definition should help the Commission and the States
to better anticipate the Court's reparations awards, which may lead to
agreements between the parties and less frequent resort to the Court for
determinations of reparations.
If the parties fail to agree in the specified time period, the Court
exerts its authority and institutes a subsequent phase of the proceedings.
At this point, the Court generally sets a date for a public hearing on
reparations and requests that the victim or the victim's family, the
Commission, and the State submit briefs on reparations. 6 The Court may
also initiate any studies that it deems necessary and call for a public
hearing.67 At the public hearing the Court hears the arguments of the
parties. A recent innovative change by the Court provides that in the
reparations phase of the case the representatives of the victims or of their
families may present their evidence and arguments directly to the Court.68
The Court then deliberates in private and subsequently issues its judgment
at a public session.6 9 The judgment of the Court is "final and not subject
to appeal. 70 If there is disagreement about its scope or meaning, the
parties may ask the Court to interpret the judgment.7'
63. The Commission requested a total of 9,889,420 lempiras in the Veldsquez Rodriguez
Case. The total amount initially awarded by the Court before the interpretation of its judgment
was 750,000 lempiras. Id. para. 9, 60(2) and 60(3). But see the Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations),
15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 92 (1993), in which the Court accepted the Commission's
recommendation as to the amount of moral damages.
64. In the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, the State argued that the compensation should be
based on the most favorable treatment available under Honduran law for the family of the
victim in the case of accidental death. That amount, plus an amount voluntarily contributed by
the State, resulted in an offer of 150,000 lempiras. Velsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory
Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 43 (1989). The total amount initially awarded
by the Court before the interpretation of its judgment was 750,000 lempiras, more than four
times the State's offer. Id. paras. 60(2) and 60(3).
65. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to be
reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), -
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 19, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 4.
66. See RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 44(2).
67. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 4 (1989).
68. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 23.
69. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 57(1).
70. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 67.
71. Id.
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III. PERSONS WHO MAY BE AWARDED REPARATIONS
BY THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
In accordance with traditional principles on causation, the Inter-
American Court has held that the State must make reparations only to
those who suffer the "immediate effects" of its unlawful acts and then
only to the extent that has been "legally recognized."72 The Court stated
that "[t]o compel the perpetrator of an illicit, act to erase all the conse-
quences produced by his action is completely impossible, since that action
caused effects that multiplied to a degree that cannot be measured.
73
Consequently, the Court has not awarded reparations to all those who
have claimed to be injured indirectly by the State's breach of its human
rights violations. The Court's determination as to who shall receive
reparations is based on the American Convention and other international
court decisions applying similar reparations provisions.74
A. The Direct Victim
The American Convention specifies that the "injured party" shall
receive reparations.7 5 The "injured party" under the American Convention
is the victim of a human rights abuse: the individual whose right or
freedom has been violated.76 Similarly, in the European human rights sys-
tem, the European Court has held that the term "injured party" is synony-
mous with the term "victim" meaning the person or persons directly
affected by a violation of the European Convention.77 To date, there have
been only two surviving direct victims in cases decided by the Inter-
American Court.78 All other direct victims have been deceased or have
disappeared as a result of the human rights violations.79
72. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49 (1993). See
Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 10 AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 333, 363-364 (1994) for a critique of this standard.
73. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 48 (1993).
74. Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 37 (Sept. 19,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
75. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
76. Id.
77. The Sunday Times Case, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1981).
78. In the El Amparo Case, sixteen fishermen were attacked by Venezuelan Special
Military Forces. Two of the fishermen survived the attack and received reparations. El Amparo
Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 2 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in
THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
79. See, e.g., Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (1993);
Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (1989);
Vel6squez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
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B. The Beneficiaries of the Direct Victim
When the direct victim is deceased or remains disappeared, the Inter-
American Court has ruled that the victim's entitlement to actual or
pecuniary damages and moral or nonpecuniary damages automatically
passes to the victim's heirs by succession.80 This may be in contrast to
the European system, in which only pecuniary damages definitely pass to
the successors of the victim. It is within the European Court's discretion
whether nonpecuniary damages for the victim's emotional distress are
awarded to the victim's heirs. The European Court deems these damages
to be personal to the victim,8 ' and passes such compensation to the heirs
only "if necessary," to advance "the cause of justice. 's2 It should be
noted, however, that in none of the cases in the European system has the
victim's death been attributed to the State or have injuries attributed to
the State resulted in the death of the victim. 83 It could be presumed that
the European Court would find that in such a case it would be necessary
to the cause of justice to award the damages to the estate of the victim.84
(1989). But see Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 60-62
(1994), in which the illegal detention of the victim was attributed to the State but his subse-
quent death while incarcerated was not.
80. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 54 (1993). The
Inter-American Court may distinguish between the beneficiaries of the damages owed to the
victim for his suffering prior to death and the beneficiaries of the damages owed the victim for
loss of life. Although the Court held that entitlement to both types of damages is an inherent
right of the deceased victim, it may differentiate as to whom those rights pass upon death. The
damages for the moral injuries of the victim up to the time of death are transmitted to the heirs
in succession. ld para. 54.
81. Montserrat Enrich Mas, supra note 41, at 782.
82. See X v. United Kingdom, 55-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16, para. 18-19 (1982). The
European Court held that "just satisfaction is to be afforded only 'if necessary', and the matter
falls to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable." Id.
para. 18.
83. In the European system, "if the death of the direct victim is the result of the alleged
violation, e.g. in the case of torture, his relatives will as a rule qualify as indirect victims." VAN
D1JK & VAN HOOF, supra note 41, at 49.
84. It is especially appropriate to award the moral damages due to the deceased victim to
the victim's successors when the violation resulted in the victim's death. If moral damages were
denied once the victim died, it would be cheaper for the State to kill a person than to injure
him. As murder is the more grievous crime, the family of the victim, which is often poor, should
receive the compensation owing to the deceased party. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984). [hereinafter PROSSER AND
KEETON].
Originally, common law denied a recovery in tort for an injury once the victim had died.
In the United States, many states currently have survival statutes which allow the victim's estate
to recover the damages which the victim would have recovered had he or she lived (increased
by the damages for death). These damages may include loss of earnings between the time of
injury and death, any medical expenses, and pain and suffering. Id. at 942-43, 954. In addition,
states have wrongful death statutes which compensate the beneficiaries for loss of any economic
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In cases involving a deceased or presumed deceased direct victim, the
Inter-American Court determines the beneficiaries of the damages award-
ed to the victim. Those beneficiaries need not first meet the requirements
of the inheritance law of the State to be considered the victim's heirs in
the Inter-American Court.85 In the absence of international customary or
conventional rules that would determine a person's successors, 86 the Inter-
American Court applies general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations to determine the issue. 87 The Court has found that under most
legal systems, successors are the deceased's children and spouse.88 If the
deceased was not married and did not have children, the person's
ascendants, his parents, are usually the heirs.89 In the Veldsquez Rodriguez
and Godinez Cruz cases, both victims were married and had children. In
those cases, the Court directed that the reparations be made to the
victims' wives and children. 90
The issue of beneficiaries was more complicated, however, in the
Aloeboetoe Case, in which in accordance with tribal custom, some of the
deceased victims had practiced polygamy, an illegal practice in Suriname.
Additionally, the marriages and births of the tribe were not legally
recognized, because they had not been officially registered with the State
as required under Surinamese law. 91 The Inter-American Court ruled that
the determination as to who were the children, spouse, and ascendants of
the deceased was to be made in accordance with local family law. 92
Although local law would normally be the law of the State, in Aloeboetoe
the Court found that Surinamese family law did not apply to the tribe.93
The Court had two bases for this holding. First, the tribe was unaware of
State law and lived by its own rules. Second, the State did not provide
the facilities necessary to legalize the marriages and register the births of
the tribe.94
benefits which they reasonably expected to receive from the decedent. These benefits may
include support or services which the decedent would have made during his lifetime. Id. at 949.
85. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 54 (1989).
86. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 61 (1993).
87. Id.; see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59
Stat. 1055.
88. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 62 (1993).
89. Id.
90. Godfnez Cruz Case, (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras.
51-53 (1989); VelAsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) paras. 56-58 (1989).
91. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 63 (1993).
92. Id. para. 62.
93. Id. para. 58.
94. Id. The Court's recognition of the culture of the tribe, although the tribe cannot be
considered indigenous within the strict meaning of the word, is important in Latin America,
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C. The Indirect Victim
In some circumstances, an individual may have so close a connection
with the direct victim that that person is considered to be an indirect
victim who has also suffered a personal injury as a result of the State's
human rights violation. The U.N. General Assembly, in its Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
declared that, "[t]he term 'victim' also includes, where appropriate, the
immediate family or dependents of the direct victim."95 The European
human rights system also recognizes the indirect victim. 96 The European
Commission defined the term "victim" as "not only the direct victim or
victims of the alleged violation, but also any person who would indirectly
suffer prejudice as a result of such violation or who would have a valid
personal interest in securing the cessation of such violation." 97
Whether the Inter-American Court will award compensation to
indirect victims is now in question. Until the Court's most recent repara-
tions decisions in El Amparo and Neira Alegria, in which it is unclear if
the Court awarded damages directly to the family of the victims,9" the
Court acknowledged the injury to those most closely related to the victim.
Although in its earlier judgments the Inter-American Court made no ex-
plicit reference to indirect victims, it nevertheless demonstrated that it in-
parts of which have large indigenous populations with their own cultures. See Pasqualucci, The
Inter-American Human Rights System, supra note 17, at 329-34.
95. G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 40th Sess., Annex para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/40/L.21 (1985). The Resolution specified that States should attempt to provide financial
compensation to the family of victims who have died or been incapacitated due to the crime.
Id. para. 12.
It is not clear whether the United Nations Committee on Human Rights also recognizes
a family member of a deceased or disappeared person as an indirect victim with the possibility
of receiving compensation in his or her own right for mental anguish, or whether family
members are only entitled to claim compensation for the victim's injury. In at least one case
(Case 107/1981), the Committee stated that the mother of a disappeared woman could herself
be considered to be the victim and urged the State to pay compensation for the wrongs
suffered. Theo Van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, para. 57, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1993/8 (1993) [hereinafter Van Boven Report].
96. See A.A. Cangado Trindade, Co-Existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of
International Protection of Human Rights (At Global and Regional Levels), 202 RECUEIL DES
CouPs 202, 265-66 (1987); VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 41, at 46.
97. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 4185/69, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 140, 142 (1970); see also Koolen v. Belgium, App. No. 1478/62, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 71, 89 (1963).
98. El Amparo Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (Sept. 14, 1996),
to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations),
__ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 4.
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cluded indirect victims within the term "injured party" under Article
63(1). 9" The Court even ruled that the State's obligation to make repa-
ration is sometimes extended to indirect victims who are not successors
of the victims but who suffered some consequence of the unlawful act."°
This. category of claimant the Court referred to as "dependents.''
Examples might include parents of a married victim, 6ther "companions"
who were supported by the victim, and illegitimate children of the
victim."2
The Court has established a three-pronged test to determine whether
the claim of an indirect victim who is. a nonsuccessor dependent should
be met. First, the victim must have previously made payments to the
claimant, even if the victim did not have a legal obligation to pay such
support."0 3 These payments must have been "regular, periodic payments
either in cash, in kind, or in services."'" A "series of sporadic contribu-
tions" would not be sufficient to meet this criteria. 5 Second, the Court
held that "the nature of the relationship between the victim and the
claimant should be such that it provides some basis for the assumption
that the payments would have continued had the victim not been
killed."' ' Third, the claimant must have had a financial need that was
met by the contributions of the victim.'0 7 The Court's test for non-
successor dependents appears equitable in that it compensates not only
99. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. (1989); Godfnez Cruz Case, (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
(1989). See infra Part V.C. The European Court has also on occasion awarded nonpecuniary
damages to indirect victims. See Colozza and Rubinat v. Italy, 89 Eur. Court H.R. (1985). In
the Colozza Case, the victim, Mr. Colozza, suffered a violation of his right to a fair trial. He
died before the case was decided by the Court. The widow claimed, in addition to pecuniary
damage, that the violation had occasioned "both for him and her, physical and mental
suffering." Id. para. 36. The Court stated that "[t]o ... [pecuniary damages] has to be added
the non-pecuniary damage undoubtedly suffered by him and by his widow." Id. para 38
(emphasis added).
100. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 67 (1993).
101. Id. para. 71.
102. In the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases, the Court asked the parties to
submit information on "any concubines [of the victim] recognized in any official documents,"
on all children born in or outside of the marriage, and on the parents of the victim. Veldsquez
Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 13 (1989);
Godfnez Cruz Case, (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 12 (1989).
103. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 68 (1993).
104. Id.
105. Id. The Court specified that the effectiveness and regularity of the contributions was
of importance. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Court clarified that "[t]his does not necessarily mean that the person should
be indigent, but only that it be somebody for whom the payment represented a benefit that, had
it not been for the victim's attitude, it would not have been able to obtain on his or her own."
Id.
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family members, but also other indirect victims who suffered serious
losses from the victim's death.'08
The Inter-American Court has refused to expand the principle of
"indirect, victim" beyond that of the victim's successors and dependents.
In the Aloebdetoe Case; for instance, the Court did not act on the re-
quest of the Commission to award moral damages to the Saramaca tribe
as a whole."° The Commission argued that the members of the tribe
"constitute a family in the broad sense of the term,"" and thus should
be awarded moral damages. The Commission reasoned that tribal society
is unique in that a person is a member of the family group, the village
community, and the tribe."' The Court, however, did not attribute
special significance to the tribal culture: rather, it found that all persons
are members of families, Citizens of a state, and also belong to interme-
diate communities" 2 and that moral compensation does not extend to
such Communities. 113
Under international human rights law, when a State has undertaken
a systematic practice of gross violations of human rights designed to
intimidate an entire community into submissiveness, there is an argument
that the community itself is an indirect victim to which it may be appro-
priate to award moral damages." 4 Under the International Law of Injury
108. The Court has held that there is a presumption that the victim's death caused actual
and moral damages to the victim's successors. Id. para. 71. The burden of proof is on the State
to show that there were no damages to successors. Conversely, the Commission has the burden
of proving that all conditions for reparations are met for persons who are not successors to the
victim, but who claim damages as dependents. Id. It may not be necessary, however, for the
Commission to prove moral damages in the case of the parents of victims who suffered a
violent death. See id. para. 76.
109. Id. para. 83.
110. Id. para. 19.
111. Id.
112. Id. para 83.
113. Id. This decision of the Court has been criticized by at least one human rights
scholar who stated:
The Commission also attempted to demonstrate that the self-esteem of an entire
people had been profoundly violated during the 1986-1987 civil war through
repeated and pitiless incursions of the army. The Committee [sic] then tried to
establish that failure to compensate the Saramaccans to restore their lost dignity
would constitute an irreparable injury to their cultural integrity. On this issue, the
Court appears to have missed the relevant issue entirely by limiting examination of
this question exclusively to the juridical character of the 1762 Treaty.
Padilla, supra note 23, at 548.
114. Gross and systematic violations of human rights are perpetrated pursuant to a
governmental policy in such a manner and in such number that the human rights of certain
groups in the population are threatened. CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: GROSS, SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM 16 (1988).
Fall 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
to Aliens, a State could demand satisfaction for moral damages from
another State for impairment of the injured State's honor or prestige."t 5
The determining factor for moral injury to the State is the "character or
gravity of the imputable act or omission." ' 16 Analogously, it could be
argued that a community is entitled to damages when the act imputable
to the State has particularly grave consequences for an entire community.
Nevertheless, the Court was probably wise in not further extending
the application of damages at this time. Historically, damages for emo-
tional distress were not awarded to third parties. The award of compen-
sation to the spouse and children of the direct victim for their own injuries
in wrongful death cases is still controversial in some areas. Despite the
unique culture of the Saramacas, the Court's refusal to further expand
moral damages beyond that which is currently accepted is understandable.
An international court cannot afford to make decisions that are "too far
advanced for community acceptance."''1
7
Recent Inter-American Court reparations decisions indicate that, rather
than expanding the list of those who will be entitled to reparations, the
Court may be retreating from its earlier more expansive decisions." 8 In
the El Amparo and Neira Alegria cases, the Court may not have awarded
damages to indirect victims." 9 If this is so, in future cases, family
members and other dependents of the direct victim, irrespective of their
relationship, may not be eligible for compensation for their own suffering.
Truth commission reports in Latin America confirmed that governments used a deliberate
policy of human rights violations to intimidate and to maintain control. See REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN
EL SALVADOR 10 (United Nations 1993) [hereinafter THE EL SALVADOR REPORT]; HONDURAN
REPORT, supra note 24, at 217-18.
115. "An act which is contrary to international law may, irrespective of whether it causes
material injury, result in moral injury to another State which consists in the impairment of the
latter's honor or prestige." GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 568 (quoting De Visscher, La
responsabiliti des itats, II BIBLIOTECHA VISSERIANA 119 (1924)).
116. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 568. Moral damages in this context usually
consisted of an apology for acts taken against official representatives of the State or against
diplomatic or consular premises. Id. at 569.
117. See Peter J. Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court
of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT.'L L. 258, 263 (1974).
118. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to
be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations),
__ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT
supra, note 4.
119. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to
be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations),
_ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 4.
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D. No Reparations for Victims Who Are Unable to
Gain Access to the Court: A Need for Reform
No procedural means exist by which the Inter-American Court can
order reparations for the majority of human rights victims, those whose
cases do not reach the Court. There are often multiple victims of similar
abuses in a State during a given period as a result of a governmental
policy of gross and systematic human rights abuses. In Honduras, for
example, from 1991 to 1994, one hundred to one hundred and fifty per-
sons disappeared.' 2° The Inter-American Commission has been deluged
with individual complaints in such situations. Only one or two of these
cases can be sent to the Court, which sits part-time.12' The Honduran
Human Rights Commissioner and former President of the Inter-American
Commission, Leo Valledares, opined that it was unfair that only those
whose cases were before the Inter-American Court received reparations
and recommended that all proven cases of disappearances should receive
economic reparations. 22 A response to the problem of limited access to
the Court would be the development of a class action type of procedure
that would allow for joinder of the cases of several victims before the
Court. In the alternative, the contentious jurisdiction of the Court could
be interpreted to include requests from the Commission that the Court
make a determination as to whether a State has perpetrated a governmental
policy of gross and systematic abuses in a State. If the Court were to find
that such a State policy existed, it could order the State to make repara-
tions to the victims. The Court would then serve as a type of claims
tribunal for persons claiming to be individual victims of that policy. Such
changes cannot be made without the express agreement of the States
Parties to the American Convention. Either procedure would consequently
require a protocol to the American Convention, which is not likely to be
accepted in the near future.
IV. TYPES OF REPARATIONS
Under international law, the term "reparations" may encompass
restitution, financial compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction. 23
120. Velisquez Rodriguez Case (Merits), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) para. 147(a) (1988).
121. See Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System, supra note 17, at 355-59.
122. THE HONDURAN REPORT, supra note 24, at 234.
123. Van Boven Report, supra note 95, para. 48. In 1989, the United Nations Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities requested that Van Boven
study international human rights norms, relevant decisions, and the views of international human
rights organs for the purpose of developing basic principles and guidelines on the subject of
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Restitution "re-establish[es], to the extent possible, the. situation that
existed for the victim prior to the violation of human rights."' 24 Full
restitution may therefore often include the other forms of reparations.
Financial compensation remedies "economically assessable damage
resulting from human rights violations."'' 25 It may recompense loss of
earnings, pain and suffering, emotional distress, medical expenses, injury
to reputation or dignity, and the costs of legal or expert assistance in
obtaining a remedy. 26 Rehabilitation may include medical or psychological
services, legal assistance, or the restoration of the victim's dignity and
reputation if the victim is alive. 27 It can also be argued that rehabilitation
of the victim's reputation continues to be necessary if the victim is
deceased or has disappeared. 28 Satisfaction may involve public disclosure
of the truth, an apology or acknowledgement of wrongdoing, the prosecu-
tion and punishment of the individual violators, and the implementation
of measures to prevent a recurrence of the violation.129 Under international
law, a victim may be awarded both satisfaction and compensation for a
breach of a duty. 30
The usual form of reparations in international law has been in the
form of financial compensation.' 3' When the damage is to the person of
the victim, however, more than financial compensation may be required.
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for the victims of gross human rights violations.
Id. para. 1. Full reparations may include, restitution in kind, financial compensation, satisfaction,
and guarantees that the violations will not be repeated. Id. para. 48. These categories often
overlap.
124. Id. para 137(8).
125. Id.
126. Id. para 137(9). Van Boven also listed harm to property or business, which would
include lost profits and lost opportunities. See generally Richard Lillich, Damages for Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Awarded by US Courts, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 207 (1993).
127. Van Boven Report, supra note 95, para. 137(10). ,
128. See Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth, supra note 26, at 332.
129. Van Boven Report on the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation,
supra note 95, para. 137(11). Satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition may include:
[c]essation of continuing violations; [v]erification of the facts and full and public
disclosure of the truth; [a] declaratory judgment in favor of the victim; [a]pology,
including the public acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of responsibility;
[b]ringing to justice the person responsible for the violations; [clommemorations and
paying tribute to the victims and, preventing the recurrence of violations.
Id.
130. Id. at 28. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has expressed the view that
to remedy human rights violations, the State must: investigate the facts, take appropriate action,
bring the responsible parties to justice, provide the victims with any necessary medical care,
and pay compensation to the victim or family members. Id. Compensation should be made for
wrongs suffered, and for "physical and mental injury and suffering caused to the victim by the
inhuman treatment to which he was subjected." Id.
131. Factory at Chorz6w (Merits), 1928 P.C.I.J. at 28.
[Vol. 18:1
Victim Reparations: Inter-American Human Rights
Sohn and Baxter observe that the duty to make reparations under interna-
tional law "may be discharged through measures designed to re-establish
the situation prior to the wrongful act or omission, or through payment
of damages, or through a combination of the two. 132 The award of repara-
tions must in effect wipe out all consequences of the illegal act.
A. Full Restitution
The Inter-American Court has held that "[r]estitution of harm brought
about by the violation of an international obligation consists in full
restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the restoration of the
prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violation, and
indemnification for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including
emotional harm."' 133 In more recent cases, however, the Court appears to
be limiting this earlier holding on full restitution. In the Aloeboetoe Case,
the Court stated that "restitutio in integrum refers to one way in which
the effect of an international unlawful act may be redressed, but it is not
the only way in which it must be redressed, for in certain cases such
reparation may not be possible, sufficient or appropriate."' 134 Full restitu-
tion is not "possible," for example, in the case of an extrajudicial execu-
tion or a disappearance in which the victim is most likely deceased
because the Court cannot guarantee to the victim the enjoyment of the
right to life that has been violated. 35
The Court did not explain when full restitution would not be "ap-
propriate."'' 36 Garcia-Amador stated in his study, The Changing Law of
International Claims, that certain forms of reparations may not be
appropriate if they prove "incompatible with the municipal law of the
132. Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 546 (1961).
133. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 26 (1989). Note that the term "patrimonial and non-patrimonial" harm appears to be a
direct translation from the Spanish. See also Godfnez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the
Compensatory Damages), 10 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 27 (1990).
134. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49 (1993).
(Emphasis in the original.)
135. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 16, to be reprinted
in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 38, to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Godfnez
Cruz Case (Merits), 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 199 (1989) cited in Aloeboetoe Case(Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 46 and 50 (1993); Veldsquez Rodriguez Case(Merits), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 189 (1988).
136. The Court could be alluding to States in which amnesty laws have granted impunity
to the violators of human rights, thereby making individual punishment of the violators
impossible. See Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth, supra note 26, at 343; see also Robert Norris,
Leyes de Impunidad y los Derechos Humanos en Las Americas: Una Respuesta Legal, 15
INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS REVISTA 47 (1992).
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respondent state, offend national honor and dignity, or [are] seriously
out lof proportion to the injury sustained or the character of the act or
omission imputed to the State."1 37 Under these criteria, however, States
could find that any form of satisfaction, such as the duty to investigate
the violation and punish the violators, is inappropriate. State discretion
of this magnitude would unduly limit the type of reparations that could
be awarded for human rights violations.
B. Compensatory or Actual Damages
The type of reparations most commonly awarded in human rights
cases is pecuniary compensation, which seeks to compensate the victims
for the "actual damages suffered.', 138 The amount of compensation that the
Inter-American Court may order a State to pay to the victims of human
rights abuse is determined by the "American Convention and the applica-
ble principles of international law."' 39 It is not "limited by the defects,
imperfections or deficiencies of national law." 4° The Court has stated that
it does not have complete discretion in determining the amount of com-
pensation for actual damages; rather it must adhere to the ordinary meth-
ods of case law in determining the award.' 4 ' As generally understood, the
term actual damages may include loss of earnings, restitution of money
or material possessions, and loss of real property.
1. Loss of Earnings
Compensation for the victim's loss of earnings is one form of actual
damages. The Inter-American Court has used various criteria in an attempt
to establish a victim's lost earnings with reasonable certainty.'42 Its efforts,
137. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 596.
138. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 50 (1993).
139. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 31 (1989).
140. Id. para. 30. In Veldsquez Rodriguez, Honduras maintained that the amount of
compensation paid to the victim's next of kin should be based on the most favorable benefits
provided by Honduran legislation in the case of accidental death. Id. at para. 5. In support of
its contention, the State produced Honduran provisions on tax, inheritance, social security, and
retirement. Id. at paras. 16-17. The Court did not agree. The Court does, of course, consider
information on national wage rates, actuary tables, etc., in determining the ultimate amount, but
it does not limit itself to the remedy available under domestic law. Id. para. 46.
141. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 87 (1993).
142. In the God(nez Cruz Case, the Court based the measurement of the victim's future
earnings on a "prudent estimate of the possible income of the victim," calculated by reference
to probable life span. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) para. 29, 47 and 50 (1989). The Court has stated that it does not base its calculations on
"rigid criteria," but rather on the circumstances of each case. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case
(Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras. 26-28 (1989); Godfnez Cruz
[Vol. 18:1
Victim Reparations: Inter-American Human Rights
however, have often been thwarted by the seasonal employment of the
victims, the lack of employment and tax records, and geographical and
cultural impediments. In the Aloeboetoe Case, for example, the victims,
members of the Saramaca tribe, lived in the jungles of south-centrhl
Suriname far from the Caribbean Coast. 143 Their tribe does not use written
documents and most of its members are functionally illiterate. 144 Moreover,
the victims did not have stable employment: they had periodically traveled
to the coasts of Suriname and French Guiana to work at construction
jobs. 45 Even with the assistance of expert witnesses, it was difficult to
establish evidence of lifetime loss of earnings "in a culture and economy
in which pay stubs, tax returns, and other ordinary means of verification
are not customarily employed."' 46
In its most recent reparations decisions, the Court has attempted to
develop more definitive criteria for calculating the amount of lost earn-
ings.1 47 For victims who have died as a result of the human rights viola-
tion, the Court will base its calculations on the victim's age and life
expectancy at the time of death and the victim's actual salary, when that
information is proved. 48 If reliable information about the victim's actual
salary is not available, the Court will normally base its calculations on the
minimum wage in the State at the time of death. 49 It is the responsibility
Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 40 (1989) cited in
Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 85 (1993).
At one time, the Court differentiated between the basis for lost earnings when the victim
was deceased as compared to when the victim was totally and permanently disabled. Veldsquez
Rodrfguez Case, (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras. 47-48 (1989);
Godfnez Cruz Case, (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 45 (1989).
Under the Court's present criteria, however, the Court will apply the same criteria whether the
lost wages are those of a deceased victim or a living victim. El Amparo Case (Reparations),
__ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 28 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 4.
143. Padilla, supra note 23, at 545.
144. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 72 (1993).
145. Padilla, supra note 23, at 546.
146. Id. at 552 (explaining why the Commission submitted sworn affidavits of family
members to establish wage earnings).
147. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 28 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
148. El Amparo Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 28 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
149. El Amparo Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 28 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
I996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
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of the parties to provide the Court with reliable evidence of the minimum
wage. 150 If they do not produce adequate evidence on this issue, the Court
will determine an amount grounded in the principles of equity and the
actual economic and social situation in Latin America. 5' For example, in
the Neira Alegria Case, the Court was not provided with official figures
on the minimum wage in Peru;'52 citing equity and the actual economic
and social situation, the Court estimated $125 per month as the probable
income of the victims. 53 Alternately, the Court may base its calculations
on the "canasta alimentaria basica," a measure based on the consumer
price index for subsistence goods, if that measure is higher than the
minimum wage in the area.' 54 Whichever measure the Court applies in
determining the amount of lost wages, the Court then deducts twenty-five
percent as an estimate of the personal expenses which would have been
incurred by the victim had he lived. 155
The Court's award of lost earnings also includes interest from the date
of the violations to the time of judgment.'56 It does not, however, include
adjustments for future inflation or salary increases. Nor is the amount
reduced to reflect the present value of the future earnings. If the victim
is living, the Court calculates lost wages based on the above criteria, but
limits the judgment to the amount of time that the victim was unemployed
due to the violations. 57 The Court has not yet been confronted with the
situation in which the victim lived and is employable in some capacity,
but due to the injuries is no longer able to engage in as gainful a position.
The parties may present expert testimony to establish proof of lost
earnings when appropriate. Thus in the Aloeboetoe Case, the Commission
introduced an anthropological expert, who testified about relevant factors
in Saramacan culture, and a representative of the accounting firm of Coo-
pers and Lybrand, who testified about the projected earnings of the victims
150. Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 50 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
151. Id. para. 49.
152. Id. para. 50.
153. Id.
154. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 28 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
155. Id.; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49 (Sept.
14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
156. Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 50 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
157. El Amparo Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 28 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4. The two survivors in the
El Amparo Case were unemployed for two years after the attack. The Court granted then each
$4,566.41 in lost wages.
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using the "present value added" method of accounting.5 8 The Court may
also employ experts or make use of its own staff in determining appro-
priate reparations proprio muto.'59 In the El Amparo Case, the Court
employed an actuarial counselor to calculate the amount of damages. 
160
In, Aloeboetoe, the Deputy Secretary of the Court went to Suriname to
make an in situ verification of the loss of earnings figures.
161
2. Other Compensation Awarded
In addition to compensating for loss of earnings, pecuniary damages
also include the restitution of money or material possessions taken from
the victims, financial reimbursement for any items that cannot be re-
turned,162 and even the reallocation of economic resources to housing,
education, health care or employment.163 As an example of the reallocation
of economic resources, in Aloeboetoe, the Court ordered the State to open
and staff the school and medical dispensary in the area of the victims'
beneficiaries.164 The Court reasoned that part of the compensation awarded
to the victims' children was meant to enable them to complete their educa-
tion, a remedy which could not be realized if the State did not provide a
school in the area of the tribe. 65 The Court's order to open basic educa-
tional and health facilities would seem to be well in keeping with the letter
and spirit of the American Convention, which provides for the progressive
development of economic, social, and cultural rights. 16
158. Padilla, supra note 23, at 546. Professor Price testified that the victims regularly
earned and saved substantial amounts, as much as $20,000, during their migratory work on the
coast. Id.
159. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56 arts. 44(3) and (4).
160. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 34 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
161. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 87 (1993).
162. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SIM SPECIAL No. 12, SEMINAR ON THE
RIGHT TO RESTITUTION, COMPENSATION, AND REHABILITATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 11 (1992). In the Aloeboetoe Case,
in which the Commission alleged that the victims were stripped of their personal possessions
before being killed, the Court did not award reimbursement because the Commission had not
presented a claim. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 80
(1993).
163. NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 162, at 11.
164. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 96 (1993).
165. Id.
166. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 26. There is an Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which specifies that there is a right to primary health care and education. Protocol of El
Salvador, arts. 10(2)(a) and 13(1), OEA/ reprinted in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 67.
Fall 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
3. Compensation for Property Rights
The Inter-American Court has not yet adjudicated a case alleging
violation of property rights. The American Convention protects the right
of individuals to "the use and enjoyment" of property. 67 The Los
Cimientos case, currently before the Inter-American Commission, may
provide an opportunity for the Court to address some of the most difficult
questions in this area. According to the petition in the Los Cimientos case,
in 1981 the Guatemalan army invaded land to which the Quiche, an
indigenous people of Guatemala, had held legal title since 1909. The
people were allegedly driven from their land, which was subsequently
occupied by a military garrison and resettlement village. The Guatemalan
Government did not compensate the Quiche people, 68 and they have filed
a complaint with the Inter-American Commission. If this case eventually
reaches the Court, and if the Court holds that this taking of property was
illegal, the Court will have the opportunity to address the question of
reparations for the violation of property rights under the American
Convention.
4. Minimal Compensation for an Inferred Violation
The Inter-American Court has awarded only minimal compensation
when it must infer that the State is responsible for a violation of the
Convention due to the State's failure to produce information requested by
the Court. 69 The parties are obligated to provide information in their
possession when the Court requests it.' 70 Should the State neglect to
respond to the Court's request for information, and other factors concur,
167. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 21(1). The Convention does, however, allow
the State to exercise eminent domain in appropriate circumstances. Article 21(2) provides that
"[n]o one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in cases and according to the forms established
by law." Id.
168. See Angela Collier, Recent Developments in Compensation for the Violation of
Property Rights, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Ctr. for Hum. Rts. and Human. L., Wash. D.C.),
Winter 1996, at 2.
169. The Inter-American Commission also has a rule which allows it to presume a violation
when the Government fails to produce information. The repeated failure of a State to reply to
even basic Commission requests for information has resulted in the Commission's rule that the
Commission will presume to be true the facts reported in a petition if the State does not provide
the pertinent information requested, provided that the evidence before the Commission does not
lead to a different conclusion. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
art. 42, modified June 29, 1987, reprinted in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 32, Booklet 9.2, at
14 [hereinafter Regulations of the Commission].
170. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 44(2).
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the Court may infer State responsibility.7 t In the Gangaram Panday Case,
for example, the Court inferred State responsibility for an illegal detention
when Suriname failed to provide it with pertinent information that would
have determined State responsibility. 72 In that case, the Court awarded
only minimal compensation to the family of the victim because the
violation was inferred rather than proved. 7 3 A Court award of only
minimal compensation in such cases could lead to the unfortunate result
that where evidence is incriminating, the State may choose to withhold
it so as to limit its exposure. The Court would be better advised to apply
the same reparations criteria in all cases in which it has determined that
the Convention has been violated.
5. Ex Gratia Compensation
Under the International Law of Injury to Aliens, States at times refuse
to accept legal responsibility for a violation, but nonetheless "as an act of
grace" pay ex gratia compensation1 74 to the State of the injured party. 71
This situation has not yet arisen in the Inter-American system, but can be
envisioned. For instance, a new government elected in a State that is
currently involved in a case in which the previous government is accused
of human rights violations, could offer to make reparations to the injured
party ex gratia but refuse to admit liability for the alleged violation. An
advantage to the new government in this scenario is that it would not then
171. Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 51 (1994).
172. Id.
173. Id. para. 70. The amount of compensation to be paid by the Government of Suriname
was set at the equivalent of $10,000. In the Gangaram Panday Case, a Surinamese citizen died
while in detention. The Court requested that the Government of Suriname provide it with a
Spanish translation of the Suriname Constitution and the substantive laws and criminal procedure
in force in Suriname at the time of the detention. When the Government did not produce the
information, the Court had no direct evidence to determine if the detention was illegal under
the Constitution of Suriname. Consequently, the illegal detention could not be proved or
disproved, and the Court "inferred" the detention to be illegal. Although local law is not usually
the determining factor before an international court, in the case of detention the American
Convention provides that "[n]o one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the
reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party
concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto." American Convention, supra note 14, art.
7(2). Thus, it was necessary for the Court to determine the law of Suriname in order to
determine if the detention was illegal.
174. "Ex gratia payment" is defined as "[p]ayment made by one who recognizes no legal
obligation to pay but who makes payment to avoid greater expense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
573 (6th ed. 1990).
175. "Some arbitral claims commissions, while holding that, strictly according to the law,
no reparation of the injury was due, have recommended to the State that it indemnify the loss
as 'an act of grace."' GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 575 (quoting JACKSON H. RALSTON,
THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 57-58 (1926)).
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be ordered to investigate the violation and to punish the violators, acts
which might jeopardize the stability of the new government.
An offer of ex gratia compensation would normally be made during
negotiations for a friendly settlement. Friendly settlement procedures in
international human rights treaties allow the government to settle cases
without loss of face while still providing for the promotion of human
rights. The American Convention provides that the Commission "shall
place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching
a friendly settlement."'' 76 A difficulty might arise if the victim or family
of the victim refused to accept the State offer of ex gratia compensation,
insisting rather on a finding of State liability from the Commission. The
case would then presumably go forward in the Commission. It would be
unlikely, however, in view of the government's attempt to remedy the
violation, that the Commission would subsequently refer the case to the
Court.'77 If the case were already before the Court when the victim
rejected the State's offer, presumably the Court would make a determina-
tion on state responsibility and, if appropriate, issue a judgment on
reparations.
C. Nonpecuniary or Moral Damages
International law traditionally provides moral damages for emotional
harm suffered by the injured party, particularly in the case of human rights
violations.178 The term "moral damages" in international law and in civil
law systems generally equates with damages for emotional distress and,
in the appropriate case, with damages for the loss of society, comfort, and
protection under common law. 179 In the Aloeboetoe Case, the Inter-
American Court held that the victims suffered moral injuries when they
were taken into illegal custody, beaten, and then killed. The Court stated
that "[tihe beatings received, the pain of knowing they were condemned
to die for no reason whatsoever, [and] the torture of having to dig their
176. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 48(1)(f).
177. The victim does not have standing to seize the Court in the Inter-American system.
See Manuel D. Vargas, Individual Access to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 601 (1984). Only the Commission or the State Parties have the right
to submit a case to the Court after a decision by the Commission. American Convention, supra
note 14, art. 61. The Commission has many cases before it in which the State refuses to accept
responsibility. Due to the part-time nature of the Court and the limited financial resources of
the Commission and the Court, the Commission can only refer select cases to the Court. See
Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System, supra note 17, at 355-59.
178. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 27 (1989).
179. For a discussion of moral damages in domestic legal systems, see Stuart Malawer,
Moral Damages in Wrongful Death Cases in Foreign Law, 7 E. J. INT'L L. 218 (1975).
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own graves" was part of the moral damage suffered by the victims who
died.' 80 The one victim who did not die immediately also suffered the
moral injury of bearing "the pain of his wounds being infested by maggots
and of seeing the bodies of his companions being devoured by vultures.''
The Court awarded compensation to the beneficiaries of the deceased
victims for the victims' moral injuries.
In several cases, the Inter-American Court has also awarded moral
damages to compensate for the emotional distress suffered by indirect
victims. 82 In the Aloeboetoe Case, the Court supported.its award of moral
damages to the parents of the victim by observing that "it is essentially
human for all persons to feel pain at the torment of their child.' 83
Apparently applying the same reasoning in the earlier Veldsquez Rodriguez
and Godinez Cruz cases, the Court awarded moral damages for the
suffering of the victims' wives and children.184 In its most recent cases,
however, the Court's award of moral damages did not specify whether it
was for the suffering of the victim alone or also for the suffering of the
victim's family. 85 In these cases, the Court divided the moral damages
between the wife, children, and parents of the victim, but it did not state
whether the relatives were receiving the damages for their own suffering
or whether they were beneficiaries of the damages granted for the
victims' suffering. 86 The Court did state that when the violation is
sufficiently serious, the moral suffering of the victims "and their fami-
lies" must be compensated. 87 The Court did not grant moral damages to
180. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 51 (1993).
181. Id.
182. Velasquez Rodrfguez (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
50 (1989).
183. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 76 (1993).
184. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49
(1989); VelAsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
51 (1989).
185. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to
be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations),
__ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 4.
186. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras. 41-42 (Sept.
14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras. 61-62 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in
THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
187. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 35 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 56 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
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the families of surviving victims, however.8' The survivors received the
total amount of the $20,000 awarded in moral damages. 9 This ruling
may indicate: first, that the Court did not find that the type of violation
suffered by the surviving victims resulted in moral suffering for their
loved ones; second, that the Court will not in the future award moral
damages to third parties when the violation is other than the right to life;
or third, that the Court is no longer awarding moral damages to third
parties in any case. The Court's original decision to award moral damag-
es to the families of victims was sound. The victims' families do suffer
emotional distress at the suffering of their loved ones and deserve to be
compensated for that suffering. Preferably, the Court's failure to award
moral damages to the family of the surviving victims in the El Amparo
Case resulted from a finding that in that particular case, the families had
not suffered. The Court should clarify its reasoning to provide a basis for
future settlement negotiations for the parties.
1. The Basis for Determining Moral Damages
Moral damages for emotional distress cannot be calculated mathe-
matically by the use of a precise formula." Nonetheless, the victim
should receive an amount approximating the loss, if possible.' 9' In the
Inter-American system, the Court has held that the amount of moral
damages is "based on the principles of equity."'" The Court claims to
consider the "particular circumstances of the case" in setting moral
damages, 93 but it now appears that the Court has determined that it will
award a set amount of moral damages in each case where moral damages
188. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 41(g) (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
189. Id.
190. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 579.
191. Id. at 580.
192. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 27 (1989); Godfnez Cruz Case, (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 61 (1989) cited in Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
86 (1993). The European Court of Human Rights also bases awards for moral damages on the
principle of equity. H v. Belgium, 127 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1987).
193. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 37 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 58 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4. The Court accepted the amount of moral damages
proposed by the Commission in the Aloeboetoe Case because it found that the amount was fair
and because there was no other data. Six of the seven victims who were murdered were
awarded the same amount of moral damages because no evidence indicated that there had been
differences in the ill treatment or injuries they received. The other victim, who watched his
companions die and then lived for a month after the assault, was granted a greater amount in
moral damages. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 91 (1993).
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are at issue, regardless of the amount of suffering borne by each of the
victims.' 94 Thus, in the El Amparo Case, in which fourteen fishermen
were murdered and two escaped, the Court without explanation set
$20,000 as the moral damages awarded to the living victims and to the
beneficiaries of the deceased victims.'95 In the Neira Alegria Case, in
which three victims perished, the Court also established $20,000 as moral
damages for each victim. 196 While it may be advantageous for settlement
purposes to establish one amount for moral damages because the parties
can then better anticipate the Court's judgment, the practice nevertheless
undermines the Court's assertion that it will consider the facts of each
case and be guided by equitable factors. Equitable principles properly
applied would require that the Court take into account the right violated
and the individual suffering of each victim when determining moral
damages.
In determining what equitable factors affect a determination of moral
damages, the Court has reasoned that it may reduce the amount of moral
damages if the State accepts international responsibility for the human
rights violations because the acceptance itself constitutes moral satisfaction
for the victims. 197 Yet moral damages for the suffering of deceased victims
should not be reduced if the State accepts international responsibility for
the violation because the amount of their suffering does not change with
the acceptance of responsibility. The moral suffering of families and
surviving victims may be ameliorated, however, with State acceptance of
responsibility for the violation. In such a case, it may be equitable for the
Court to reduce the award of damages for moral suffering of the families
and surviving victims. The Court distinguished the large awards of moral
damages in the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases against
Honduras from the lesser awards in the Aloeboetoe and El Amparo cases
because Suriname accepted responsibility for the violations in Aloeboetoe
and Venezuela accepted responsibility in El Amparo.198 If the Court does
decrease moral damages when the State voluntarily accepts responsibility,
194. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (Sept. 14, 1996),
to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations),
__ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 4.
195. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (Sept. 14, 1996),
to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
196. Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
197. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 34 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
198. Id.
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it may influence States to accept responsibility in future cases. This
possible influence was undermined, however, when the Court awarded the
same amount of moral damages in El Amparo, in which Venezuela
accepted responsibility, as it did in Neira Alegria, in which Peru did not
accept responsibility for the violations. Identical awards of moral damages
per victim in both cases negates the Court's assertion that acceptance of
international responsibility may reduce moral damages, and, therefore, it
undermines settlement negotiations on that basis. If the Court is going to
reduce awards for moral damages when the state accepts responsibility for
a violation, it must do so consistently to encourage State acknowledgement
of human rights violations.
Finally, in some instances the Court has also concluded, in accordance
with the judgments of other international courts and with its own jurispru-
dence, that the Court's judgment itself may constitute sufficient compensa-
tion for moral injuries. 99 In considering this approach in the El Amparo
Case, however, the Court wisely held that when the violation is serious,
such as the violation of the right to life, principles of equity mandate that
the victims and families should also receive monetary compensation.2'
The Court has consistently awarded moral damages for serious violations
of human rights and should continue to do so. To date, the Court has not
been confronted with less egregious violations. In the future, when cases
of less serious human rights violations are before the Court, it may be
sufficient to compensate the victim financially for actual losses and allow
the Court's judgment to compensate for any moral damages.
2. Proof of Moral Injury
The Commission need not prove moral injury to the victim. Moral
injury to the victim can be presumed from the character of the abuse. The
Court has noted that "it is characteristic of human nature" that any person
subjected to State aggression and abuse will experience moral suffering."°
With this understanding of human nature, it would appear that no evidence
beyond the State's admission of responsibility for the violation is required
to prove moral damages to the victims.
In cases where the Court ordered moral damages for the suffering of
indirect victims, the Court has considered the relationship of the claimants
199. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 35 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 56 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
200. Id.
201. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 52 (1993).
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to the victim in determining whether moral injury must be proved. In the
Aloeboetoe Case, the Court held that the moral suffering of the parents
could be presumed as a result of the cruel death of their sons.2° In the
Veldsquez Rodriguez and God(nez Cruz cases, in which the State did not
voluntarily accept responsibility for the disappearances of the victims, the
Commission produced expert psychiatric testimony as to the psychological
problems suffered by the wives and children of the men who had disap-
peared.2 °3
D. Rehabilitation
To date, the Inter-American Court has had no opportunity to order
physical rehabilitation for victims of human rights violations. All but two
of the victims for whom reparations have been ordered were deceased or
missing.2°4 The only two surviving victims were fishermen who survived
the attack at El Amparo.25 Presumably they did not require rehabilitation
as the Commission did not request it.
Physical rehabilitation is not the only type of rehabilitation that the
Court could order. The Court could also accede to requests for reparations
that would rehabilitate the reputations of the victims. In some instances
in Latin America, States that abused human rights pursued policies that
maligned victims by accusing them of'being subversives, terrorists,
enemies of the State, or common criminals. The Decree establishing the
Chilean Truth Commission explains the rationale underlying the rehabili-
tation of the victim's reputation: "only the knowledge of truth will restore
the dignity of the victims in the public mind, allow their relatives and
mourners to honor them fittingly, and in some measure make it possible
to make amends for the damage done." 2°6 Some public action on the part
202. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 76 (1993). The
Court reasoned that "it is essentially human for all persons to feel pain at the torment of their
child." Id.
203. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 49
(1989); VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 51 (1989). In awarding moral damages, the Court did not distinguish between those
damages awarded to the beneficiaries for the victim's suffering and those awarded to the
beneficiaries for their own suffering. Although this approach may not be analytically satisfactory,
the European system also does not make a clear distinction. In both systems such damages are
based on equitable principles.
204. El Amparo Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 37 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
205. Id.
206. Decree Establishing the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Supreme
Decree No. 365 (Apr. 25, 1990) reprinted in REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Philip E. Barryman, trans. 1993) [hereinafter CHILEAN
REPORT]. See also NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 162, at 12 ("[Tlhe
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of the State, which would serve to admit that those who were killed or
who remain disappeared were innocent victims, could serve to rehabilitate
their reputations. 7
E. Satisfaction
Satisfaction is awarded in cases in which the injury "cannot be
repaired."2 8 It is most often granted when there has been a moral wrong
in addition to material harm.209 A judgment on the merits in a human
rights case "is in itself a type of reparation and moral satisfaction of
significance and importance for the families of the victims. '"210 Moreover,
a judgment against the State contributes to the clearing of the victim's
name, which in addition to rehabilitating the reputation of the victim, may
also be a form of satisfaction.
1. Forms of Satisfaction Ordered by
the Inter-American Court
In addition to the judgment itself, the Inter-American Court has also
ordered two forms of satisfaction specifically tailored to the types of
violations which most commonly come before the Court. First, when
confronted with victims who have been forcibly disappeared, the Court
has required the State to use all means available to inform the families of
revelation of the truth is a useful means to remove the stigma from the victims who are
burdened by a sense of responsibility for their own victimization.... Society is often inclined
to treat victims with a shunning or shame because it is thought that they must have done
something wrong to bring about their victimization. Public disclosure of the facts will make it
clear that the victim was not responsible or guilty of causing his/her own harm.").
207. The Court, however, has not acceded to requests from the families of the victims to
order the Government to honor the memory of the disappeared by, for example, naming a street,
park, or other public structure after them. For the families' requests, see Aloeboetoe Case(Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 20 (1993); Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensa-
tory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 6 (1989); VelAsquez Rodrfguez Case(Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 7 (1989). These actions could
serve to rehabilitate the good name of the victims.
208. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 572. Although satisfaction was traditionally
granted to the State of the injured alien, this was not necessarily the case. Garcia-Amador notes
that "even in cases involving the reparation of injuries sustained by private individuals where
the question of 'moral injury' to the State of nationality is not raised, certain measures are
sometimes applied which imply 'satisfaction', given to the individual concerned rather than
reparation stricto sensu, however, this is a question of terminology and not of substance." Id.
at 573.
209. Id. at 572. While most other forms of reparations are compensatory in nature, some
forms of satisfaction are considered to be punitive. Id. at 574-75.
210. VelAsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 36 (1989). The European Court has repeatedly held that in regard to nonpecuniary damage,
the Court's judgment constitutes "sufficient just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 50."
Manifattura Fl v. Italy, 230-B Eur. Court H. R. (ser. A) at 21 (1992).
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the victims' fate and to locate their remains.211 Second, the Inter-American
Court has indicated that the State has a continuing duty to punish the
violators of human rights. In the judgment on the merits of the Cabal-
lero Delgado and Santana Case, the Court stated that "reparations should
consist of the continuation of the judicial proceedings for the clarification
of the disappearance of Isidro Caballero, Delgado and Marfa del Carmen
Santana and punishment in conformance with Colombian domestic law. 213
The Court's ruling may provide a means of satisfaction for the family
of the victims if the domestic laws of the State provide for punishment.
Difficulties may arise, however, if the State has promulgated an amnesty
law that grants de jure impunity to the violators of human rights.214 Where
impunity prevails, a victim's right to reparation for gross violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms "is likely to become illusory. 215
The amnesty laws passed in many States, which prohibit the prosecution
of alleged violators, may not be compatible with the States' international
obligations to provide an effective remedy.216 These domestic laws should
not be the concern of an international court, however. As provided in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty. '217 Given this principle of international law, the Court in ordering
reparations should require that the State, as satisfaction, investigate human
rights crimes and punish the violators. If the State's duty to punish is
211. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 109 (1993)
(quoting the Godfnez Cruz Case (Merits), 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 191 (1989) and
the Velisquez Rodrfguez Case (Merits), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) para. 181 (1988)).
212. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 32
(1989); Velsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
34 (1989).
213. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case (Merits), 22 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
69 (1995).
214. See generally Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth, supra note 26.
215. Van Boven Report, supra note 95, para. 130. Van Boven further stated that "[i]t cannot
be ignored that a clear nexus exists between the impunity of perpetrators of gross violations of
human rights and the failure to provide just and adequate reparation to the victims and their
families or dependents." Id. para 126.
216. Van Boven stated:
In many situations where impunity has been sanctioned by the law or where de facto
impunity prevails with regard to persons responsible for gross violations of human
rights, the victims are effectively barred from seeking and receiving redress and
reparation. In fact, once the State authorities fail to investigate the facts and to
establish criminal responsibility, it becomes very difficult for victims or their relatives
to carry on effective legal proceedings aimed at obtaining just and adequate repara-
tion.
Id. at 51.
217. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 27.
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made dependent on the internal law of the State, the fundamental objec-
tives of the American Convention will be undercut by the ability of States
to define this aspect of their human rights obligations without regard to
the concerns of the international community.
2. Possible Limits on the Court's Authority
to Order Satisfaction
The Inter-American Court may be concerned about limits on its
authority to direct the State to take action.218 Although the Court has broad
powers to order remedial measures under Article 63(1),219 it could be
argued that its authority does not extend to an order to punish the
violators. According to this argument, punishment of the violators may
not be contemplated under any of the three prongs of Article 63(1), in that
it may not ensure the victim enjoyment of the right violated, remedy the
consequences of the situation that constituted the breach, or provide fair
compensation. The Court has stated, however, that an order to investigate
the facts of the violation or to punish those responsible "would constitute
a part of the reparation of the consequences of the violation of rights or
freedoms."220 The second prong of Article 63(1) would therefore encom-
pass punishment of human rights violators as ordered by the Court.22' In
further support of its authority to order punishment, the Inter-American
Court has interpreted Article 63(1) to require restitutium integrum, full
restitution, in accordance with general principles of law whenever possible.
As stated earlier, the remedy of full restitution includes the duty to
218. The Convention authorizes the Court to order a State to take provisional measures
to protect certain persons. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(2). The Court does not
generally determine the specific measures to be taken, leaving that decision to the States. If the
State, however, fails to adopt adequate measures, the Court can make specific demands on the
State. In its orders of provisional measures, the Court has also ordered the State to investigate
violations and to punish perpetrators. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-
American Human Rights System: An Innovative Development in International Law, 26 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 803, 842-44 (1993). Whether the Court issues'that order because the State
will incur international liability if it does not investigate and punish, or because the State must
do so as satisfaction for the victims, is irrelevant in this context.
219. See supra Part I.
220. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 33 (1989). The American Convention provides that the victim of a human rights violation
must have recourse to a competent court even though the "violation may have been committed
by persons acting in the course of their official duties." American Convention, supra note 14,
art. 25(1). In this regard, the American Convention requires that the State undertake the
obligation "to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined
by the competent authority." Id. art. 25(2) (emphasis added).
221. Bissonnette argued that the combined employment of satisfaction and other reparations
"accomplishes the purpose of 'wiping out ... all the consequences of the unlawful act or
omission."' GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 573 (quoting P.A. BISSONNETTE, LA SATISFAC-
TION COMME MODE DE RtPARATION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 55-56 (1952)).
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investigate and punish.222 Consequently, domestic amnesty laws which
legislate impunity should not inhibit the Court from ordering the State to
punish those who violate human rights.
The question also arises as to whether the Court maintains the authori-
ty to rule on the international illegality of a domestic law after the State
has already accepted responsibility for a human rights violation. In the El
Amparo Case, the Commission requested that the Court assess the
compatibility of particular provisions of the Venezuelan Code of Military
Justice with the American Convention. 223 The Court, in accepting the
State's acknowledgement of responsibility, held that the subsequent phase
of the proceedings would deal solely with questions of reparations and not
with the question of compatibility. Although Judge Cancado Trindade
concurred in the judgment of the Court, in a separate opinion he argued
that the Court should have expressly reserved the authority to decide upon
the compatibility of the Venezuelan law in question with the American
Convention.2 Persuasive arguments exist on both sides of this debate. On
the one hand, the State may be more likely to accept international
responsibility if it can thereby avoid such a decision of the Court. On the
other hand, the Court may have a duty to the development of human rights
law to rule on compliance of domestic laws with the Convention.
3. Apology. as Satisfaction
The Inter-American Court has never ordered a State to apologize for
a violation, a form of satisfaction not uncommon under the principles of
222. Some international treaties and international legal scholars maintain that punishment
of the violator is part of the remedy to be accorded the victim. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth,
supra note 26, at 353-56.
Responsibility involves for the State concerned an obligation to make good the
damage suffered in so far as it results from failure to comply with the international
obligation. It may also, according to the circumstances, and when this consequence
follows from the general principles of international law, involve the obligation to
afford satisfaction to the State which has been injured in the person of its national,
in the shape of an apology (given with the appropriate solemnity) and (in proper
cases) the punishment of the guilty person.
GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 572 (quoting Preparatory Committee of the Hague
Conference, Basis of Discussion No. 29, League of Nations Publ. Ser. V. Legal 1929 V. 3(1929)).
223. El Amparo Case (Merits), 19 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 4 (1995).
224. Id. (A. A. Cangado Trindade, J., concurring). In the subsequent judgment on
reparations, the Court held that it could not decide on the conformity of the Venezuelan Code
of Military Justice with the American Convention on Human Rights because the Code had not
been applied in the El Amparo Case. The Court quoted an earlier advisory opinion in which
it stated that the Court could not resolve abstract cases through contentious procedures. El
Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 59 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be
reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4. In his dissenting opinion, Cancado
Trindade stated that an existing law can violate rights even when it has not been applied because
of the actual threat to particular persons. Id. (A. A. Cangado Trindade, J., dissenting).
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the International Law of State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens. Under
traditional international law, the apology was extended from one State to
another, and not from a State to an injured individual.225 In recent years,
international law has evolved, and States now have direct obligations to
individuals as well.226 It may not be acceptable at this time in history for
a Court, whose very jurisdiction must be expressly accepted by the State
Party, to demand that a sovereign State apologize to an individual. It will,
however, be a sign of the true advancement of human rights when a Court
such as the Inter-American Court can order the State to apologize for an
egregious violation, or in the case where the State accepts international
responsibility, that, as an act of grace, it voluntarily and publicly make
such an apology to the victim or the family. An apology should not be
considered a blemish on the honor of the State; it would instead be a mark
of honor for the State to disown abusive acts and express its regret that
those acts were perpetrated in its territory.227
F. No Punitive Damages
The Inter-American Court has not awarded punitive damages for even
the most egregious of human rights violations. The Court interpreted the
American Convention requirement that "fair compensation be paid to the
injured party" to include only compensatory and not punitive damages.228
This interpretation is not surprising in that punitive damages are not
authorized in civil law systems, and, even in the United States, they are
often under attack.229 In the Anglo-American system, domestic courts may
award punitive damages when a wrongful act was aggravated by violence,
oppression, malice, or wanton and wicked conduct by the defendant. 230
The award of punitive damages is then meant to punish the defendant for
the evil behavior or outrageous conduct and to set a deterring example for
similar wrongdoers.23' Such an award is above and beyond the amount
225. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 45, at 569.
226. See generally, Sohn, supra note 11.
227. Unfortunately, current reality in many States is still far removed from this vision. In
fact, States have often declared that those who even report human rights abuses are traitors to
the State.
228. Vel6squez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C)
para. 38 (1989).
229. High Court Examines, Gingerly, Issue of Punitive Damages' Limit, N.Y. TIMES,
October 12, 1995, at A18.
230. KEETON ET AL., supra note 84, at 9-10.
231. Id. Attorneys for the victims in the Honduran disappearance cases requested punitive
damages because the cases involved "extremely serious violations of human rights." Godfnez
Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 35 (1989); Veldsquez
Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 37 (1989).
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necessary to compensate the plaintiff for loss. 232
An award of punitive damages is often considered to be an unjustified
windfall to the plaintiff. The families of the victims who requested
punitive damages in the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases,
however, did not intend to keep any punitive damages awarded. Instead,
they formally promised the Court that all punitive damages would be
donated to a fund to benefit the families of other Honduran disappearance
victims. 233 The Court did not grant this request.
Although the Inter-American Court did not award punitive damages
in these cases, it did not preclude the possibility of a future punitive
award. The Court acknowledged that punitive damages are awarded in
some domestic courts, but held that the principle of awarding punitive
damages "is not applicable in international law at this time. '' 234 The
limitation "at this time" allows for the possibility that at some future time
punitive damages might be awarded in the Inter-American system. If
punitive damages were not awarded in the Velasquez Case, however,
where the violation was so egregious and the State did not accept inter-
national responsibility, it is difficult to imagine a case in which punitive
damages would be awarded by the Inter-American Court.235
232. KEETON ET AL., supra note 84, at 9.
233. Briefs of the Veltlsquez Rodrfguez and Godfnez Cruz Families to the Inter-American
Court, March 10, 1989 at 9-10.
234. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 38 (1989); Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 36 (1989).
Whiteman stated in DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
Since the prevention of the crime is far more desirable than any later punishment of
the guilty, no matter how promptly or effectively this latter may be accomplished,
where it can be proven that the state was on notice of a pending disorder, or crime,
and being able, nevertheless failed to prevent or suppress its commission, higher
indemnities should be allowed than in those cases where there was no notice or
opportunity to prevent the crime. Where the state fails in its duty to prevent, it would
seem that justification may be said to exist here, if ever, for punitive or exemplary
damages. A state which has knowledge that crime is brewing and, being able to
prevent the injury, nevertheless does nothing to prevent it, is as culpable in its
conduct as those who participate in the crime. Without using the language of
complicity, it is possible to look at the wrong of the state under such circumstances
as a separate wrong apart from the offense committed by its national.
WHITEMAN, supra note 7, at 36 (emphasis added). See also CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REME-
DIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-28 (1991) for a discussion of punitive damages in interna-
tional law.
235. In approaching the issue of punitive damages in future cases, the Inter-American
Court could consider the reasoning in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D.N.Y.
1984). In Filartiga, the district court awarded punitive damages because it was "essential and
proper to grant the remedy of punitive damages in order to give effect to the manifest
objectives of the international prohibition against torture." Id. The court also emphasized that
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G. Expenses, Costs, and Attorneys' Fees
Once State responsibility has been established, the Court may then
order the State to pay the expenses borne by the families in investigating
the whereabouts of the victim and in processing the case at the domestic
level.236 The effort involved in investigating the fate of the victims, in
taking the necessary actions to exhaust domestic remedies,237 and in
bringing a case before the Inter-American Commission and Court can be
costly. 238 In the Inter-American system, most of the domestic expenses are
initially borne by the victim's family. Subsequently, nongovernmental
organizations and attorneys interested in the precedential nature of the
cases often volunteer their services pro bono before the Inter-American
Commission and Court. The families seldom, therefore, have incurred
attorneys' fees for bringing their cases before the organs of the Inter-
American system.
Originally, the Court required that expenses, which must actually be
incurred by the victims or their families, be pleaded and proved by the
Commission.239 It is often difficult, however, for the Commission to
provide adequate proof of expenses incurred where the living conditions
punitive damages aim to deter similar wrongful conduct and that "[t]o accomplish that purpose
this court must make clear the depth of the international revulsion against torture and measure
the award in accordance with the enormity of the offense. Thereby the judgment may perhaps
have some deterrent effect." Id. at 866.
236. See Caballero Delgado and Santana Case (Merits), 17 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
paras. 71 and 72(6) (1995); Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
paras. 94, 95, and 111 (1993).
However, the Court has dismissed the Commission's requests for all costs and expenses,
including presumably those incurred by the family, when the Court has inferred State respon-
sibility because the State has failed to provide information requested by the Court. See supra
Part IV.B.4. This decision could have the unfortunate repercussion of encouraging States to
withhold incriminating information to minimize the extent of their financial responsibility to
the victims.
237. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 46(a).
238. There are no filing fees to bring a case before the Commission and the Court. There
are other expenses, however, such as the costs of providing the necessary documents and
attending the public hearings.
239. In the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases, the Court stated that the
expenses incurred by the family in investigating the whereabouts of the victim are theoretically
a part of the damages which may be awarded, but it did not award expenses in these cases
because they had neither been pleaded nor proved. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory
Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 40 (1989); Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, (Com-
pensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 42 (1989): In the Aloeboetoe Case, the
Court awarded the amounts claimed as expenses by the families for investigating the disap-
pearance of the victims. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
94-5 (1993). The Court did not award the costs of exhausting domestic remedies, however,
because these had not been incurred directly by the families. When these expenses have been
borne by the family, the practice of the Court should require that the State reimburse them.
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of the families hampered conservation of receipts.2m The Court dealt with
this recurring problem in its most recent reparations judgments. In El
Amparo and Neira Alegria cases, the Court ruled that "[e]ven when no
evidence whatsoever has been presented as to the amount of expenses, the
Court considers it equitable to award $2000 to each of the families of the
•.. victims as compensation for expenses incurred in taking domestic ac-
tion."'24 ' Again, the decision of the Court to award a set amount obviates
the socio-economic difficulties of providing proof of expenses and
provides a basis for settlement of the case. On the other hand, it leaves
the Court vulnerable to charges that the awards are arbitrary. For instance,
in El Amparo, the Court ordered Venezuela to pay fourteen families of
victims and two surviving victims two thousand dollars each, for a total
of $32,000 in expenses.242 One would assume that the families acted in
concert in bringing actions before the domestic authorities and that the
award, therefore, probably multiplies the expenses actually incurred. It is
also an open question as to whether the Court will award a greater
amount of actual expenses if the Commission presents adequate proof of
additional expenses.
As to attorneys' fees, the Court has refused the Commission's re-
quests to order the State to pay the fees of private attorneys who repre-
sent the victims before the Commission and who serve as advisors to the
Commission before the Court.4 3 To date, all of the attorneys who
represented complainants before the Inter-American Commission, in cases
that then were sent to the Court, have been employed by nongovernmen-
240. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 18 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
241. Id. para. 21; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
42 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4. In the El
Amparo Case, the Court also granted the amount of $2000 in expenses to each of the surviving
victims.
242. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 21 (Sept. 14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
243. See, e.g., Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) paras.
112-14 (1993). In the Inter-American system, the complainant has the right to name an attorney
to assist in the action before the Commission. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, art. 27, modified June 29, 1987, reprinted in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
32, Booklet 9.2, at 10. Subsequently, however, if either the Commission or the State refers the
case to the Court, the claimant does not have the status of "party" to the case, and therefore
does not have the right to legal representation before the Court. Only the Commission and the
State Party involved have standing before the Court. American Convention, supra 14, at art.
61. The Court has partially remedied this situation by providing in its rules of procedure that
the Commission may name the victims' attorneys as assistants to the Commission before the
Court. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 22. See Pasqualucci, The Inter-American
Human Rights System, supra note 17, at 320; see generally, Claudio Grossman, Disappearances
in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim Representation in Human Rights Litigation, 15
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 363 (1992).
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tal organizations and have served pro bono.244 Consequently, the claimant
has not been under an obligation to pay them. Nonetheless, the Commis-
sion has requested that the Court award attorneys' fees. The Court has
refused this request, stating that if the Commission fulfills its function by
"contracting outside professionals instead of using its own staff," it could
not demand attorneys' fees.245 Presently there are qualified and dedicated
lawyers who are willing to undertake uncompensated assistance; thus, the
current arrangement may continue to function in the Inter-American
system. If, however, nongovernmental organizations lose other sources of
funding, victim representation in the Inter-American system may be
adversely affected.
In the European human rights system, the compensation awarded by
the Court includes attorney's fees and other expenses paid by the victim
to bring a case at the domestic level and before the European Commis-
sion and Court.246 The applicant's attorney is generally awarded attor-
neys' fees when the Court rules that the State violated the applicant's
rights. In determining the amount of an award of costs and expenses, the
European Court ascertains "whether the costs and expenses claimed were
actually incurred, necessarily incurred and reasonable as to quantum."247
Thus, if the applicants are not under an obligation to pay the attorney,
the European Court holds that the costs have not been "actually incurred"
244. For example, Dr. Claudio Grossman was a professor for American University at the
time that he represented the applicants in Aloeboetoe. He specified to the Court that he had
rendered his services pro bono and that any recovery for attorney's fees would accrue to the
nongovernmental organizations he represented. Padilla, supra note 23, at 548-49.
245. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 114 (1993). The
Commission operates on a limited budget with a small staff which does not have the time or
resources to fully prepare each case. See Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights
System, supra note 17, at 355-59.
246. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 41, at 170 (citing Judgment of April 7, 1961, 2
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1961)). The European Court amended the Rules of the Court to
allow the original applicant to present his own case or to have it presented by his representa-
tive independently from the Commission. The applicant is usually represented by an attorney.
Id. at 170. The European Commission is not a party to the case before the Court, as is the
Inter-American Commission; it is rather a "representative of the public interest." Id. at 161-62.
247. Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1987). See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF,
supra note 41, at 178-79. Article 50 of the European Convention provides:
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any
other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with
the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this
decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.
European Convention, supra note 12, art. 50. The European Court awarded the costs incurred
by the victim for an expert witness who testified in proceedings before the domestic court. Inze
v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1987).
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and does not compensate for them. 4
Unlike the European human rights system, the Inter-American Court
refuses to reimburse any costs of litigation before the Commission and
the Court, whether these costs are borne by the Commission or by
nongovernmental organizations.249 The Court recently adopted a proce-
dural rule specifying that the party that proffers evidence must cover the
costs associated with bringing that evidence before the Court.250 In the
Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, the Commission requested that
the State be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the counsel of the Com-
mission in bringing witnesses to testify.25' The Court denied this request,
stating that "the Commission cannot demand that expenses incurred as a
result of its own internal work structure be reimbursed through the
assessment of costs. The operation of the human rights organs of the
American system is funded by the Member States by means of their
annual contributions. 252
It is generally recognized, however, that the funding of the Inter-
American human rights organs is inadequate.253 The Court's failure to
248. McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras.
220-21 (1995). The European system provides indigent complainants with legal aid to pay
attorneys' fees as well as travel, hotel, and other necessary expenses for the victim and
attorney to appear before the Commission and the Court. See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra
note 41, at 64 (citing Rules of Procedure of the European Commission of Human Rights,
Addendum to the Rules, art. 4(2), in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTS 117, 139 (Strasbourg 1987)). Should the victim be
vindicated and the Court award attorney's fees, the amount of legal aid received by the victim
may be subtracted from the award. McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at para. 222. The Inter-American system does not currently have the funding to
provide legal aid. Should adequate funding be available in the future, it would be beneficial if
the OAS allocated funds for legal aid in that it would encourage local attorneys to pursue cases
within the Inter-American system.
249. Originally, in the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases, the Court did not
rule on the costs of litigation because of the Commission's failure to plead them. Vel~squez
Rodrfguez Case (Merits), 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 193 (1988); Godfnez Cruz Case(Merits), 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 202 (1989). In the Aloeboetoe Case, it appeared
that the Court denied costs in part due to the Government's acceptance of international
responsibility. The Court held that as "Suriname has expressly accepted its international
responsibility and has not in any way hindered the proceedings for the fixing of reparations,
the Court dismisses the Commission's request for reimbursement of costs." Aloeboetoe Case(Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 115 (1993). See also El Amparo Case
(Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 63 (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE
1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira Alegria Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) par. (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
250. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 45.
251. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case (Merits), 17 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
23(6) (1995).
252. Id, para. 70 (quoting Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 114 (1993)).
253. See Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System, supra note 17, at
355-59.
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award costs may result in a serious limitation on the number and types
of cases that the Commission can afford to refer to the Court.2 4 It is not
in keeping with the spirit of the enforcement of human rights if the
Commission must first consider whether the financial burden of bringing
a particular case before the Court is acceptable. The Commission's
decision should be based solely on the merits of the individual case and
its precedential value for international human rights law. If the States that
are liable for human rights violations are not required to pay the costs of
the case, all States in the Organization of American States (OAS) should
pay toward adequately funding the Commission and the Court.
V. DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE AWARDS TO BENEFICIARIES
WHEN THE VICTIM IS DECEASED
The Inter-American Court has established definitive criteria for the
distribution to beneficiaries of damages when the direct victim of the
human rights violations is deceased or remains disappeared. In general,
the Court divides the damages between the children, spouse, and parents
of the victim. To date, the married deceased victims have all been male.
The Court has awarded the wife of the victim only a one-quarter to one-
third share of each category of damages. 5 The larger portion is paid to
the victim's children, and, in some cases, the compensation is also
divided with the parents of the victim. In both the Veldsquez Rodriguez
and the Godinez Cruz cases, the Court awarded only one-fourth of the
amount of material compensation to the wife and three-fourths to the
children. 6 This apportionment was used even when there was only one
child with whom to share the award. Thus, in the Godinez Cruz Case the
daughter received three-quarters of the judgment in trust and her mother
the remainder.257
254. As mentioned above, the Commission and the Court do not receive the funding
necessary to staff and investigate effectively complaints and cases. Id. The costs of a case
would presumably include the expenses of hiring expert witnesses or bringing witnesses to the
Commission in Washington and the Court in Costa Rica for the hearings on the case. Costs
could also include the expenses of fact-finding missions to the State. The Court also refrains
from assessing any expenses incurred by the Court in investigating the case. Aloeboetoe Case
(Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 114 (1993).
255. The Court used the term "wife" rather than spouse. Presumably the same criteria will
apply if the victim is a deceased, married female.
Only in the Gangaram Panday Case, in which the Court awarded $10,000 for the illegal
detention of the victim who died in custody, did the Court grant the widow one-half of the
compensation. The other half was to be paid to the children if the victim had children.
Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 70 (1994).
256. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 58 (1989); Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 53 (1989).
257. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 53
(1989).
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Another important factor in the distribution of damage awards is the
Court's requirement that trust funds be established for awards to children
and even, in some instances, for adults. In the Veldsquez Rodriguez and
Godtnez Cruz cases, the Court specified that the children receive monthly
payments from the trust fund.258 In the Aloeboetoe Case, however, the
Court required that the mothers themselves provide the children with
assistance, food, clothing, and education.259 The money held in trust for
the children of the victims was "to cover subsequent study expenses, or
else to create a small capital when they begin to work or get married. ' '260
The Aloeboetoe judgment also specified that the money in trust for the
children be used for ordinary expenses only when "grave problems or
health or family finances require it."
26
'
The Court has not stated its reasons for granting widows only a small
share of the award. The Court's holding may reflect societal factors more
common in Latin America such as that children are expected to care for
their aging parents, that it is more acceptable for nonmarried women to
work outside the home, or that the woman may remarry and be supported
by her husband. Whatever the societal influences on the Court, the small
proportion of the award appears to be inequitable to the mothers who
must now provide for their children alone and who may not have spousal
assistance in their old age. The American Convention specifies that the
responsibilities of the spouses should be balanced adequately in mar-
riage.262 The husband, had he lived, would have contributed his wages to
the support of the family. The actual damages awarded for lost wages,
which represent the amount that the victim would have contributed to the
support of the family, should therefore be allocated for that purpose. It
seems unfair that the wife should now shoulder that burden alone and
that the husband's share be reserved for the children's later needs. None
of the families awarded compensation to date have been wealthy.
The Court has recently clarified its criteria for the division of dam-
ages between the beneficiaries. The Court apportions the actual damages,
including lost wages, between the beneficiaries as follows. One-third is
258. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case, (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 58 (1989); Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 53 (1989).
259. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 106 (1993).
260. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 106 (1993).
261. Id.
262. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 17(4). Article 17(4) of the American
Convention requires that "[t]he States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality
of rights and the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during
marriage, and in the event of its dissolution." Id.
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awarded to the spouse of the deceased and two-thirds to the children who
divide their share equally.263 If the victim was not married but had a
companion, the spouse's portion is to be paid to the companion.26 If the
victim had both a spouse and a companion, presumably only the legal
spouse will be compensated.265 Should the victim have neither a spouse
nor a companion, the corresponding part of the damages is to be paid to
the victim's parents, even though they may not be involved in supporting
the victim's children. 266 In most cases, the criteria developed by the
Court for the distribution of damages to the beneficiaries will be equita-
ble in that the money will be used to support any children of the victim.
The situation could arise, however, wherein the children are orphaned
and are not in the care of the parents of the victim who receive the
spouse's allocation of the damages. In this case, the actual damages, a
portion of which is lost wages, will not be used for the support of the
victim's children. This situation could be avoided if the Court would
alter its criteria to put the deceased spouse's share of actual damages in
trust for the children of the victim, if there are children, rather than
awarding it to the victim's parents. The trust could be structured to allow
monthly interest payments for the children's support to be made to the
guardians of the children.
The Court apportions moral damages one-fourth to the spouse, one-
half to the children, and one-fourth to the parents of the victim. 267 If
there is no surviving spouse or companion, that share will be divided
among the children.268 In all cases in which the parents of the victim are
deceased, their share of the damages is awarded to the victim's children.
263. El Amparo Case (Reparations), _ Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 41 (Sept.14,
1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4.
264. Id. para. 41(c). Poor couples in some Third World States sometimes do not marry
formally but rather become "companeros" (companions), live together, and raise children
together as if they were legally married. In such a case, the Court has sagely apportioned a
share of the damages to the victim's companion.
265. When a poor couple does marry, however, they seldom have the money or the access
to the legal system to divorce legally if there are problems. Consequently, when they separate,
each may take on another companion and start a new family. Accordingly, the criteria laid
down by the Court in the Neira Alegria Case, in which it awarded a share of the damages to
the legal wife, but not to a companion if the wife is living, does not account for social reality.
Although it may be public policy to encourage men to stay with their original families, in
countries that are largely Catholic, and where divorce (if available) is expensive, it is also
unjust to women to disinherit the "companion" who may be raising the victim's young
children. The Court should consider the particular circumstances of each case in determining
beneficiaries.
266. Id. para. 41(d).
267. Id. para. 41(b).
268. Id. para. 41(d).
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If only one parent is living, that parent receives the share of both par-
ents.269 Surviving victims receive all the damages corresponding to them
for their actual and moral injuries.
VI. METHOD OF PAYMENT
The Court generally orders the State to pay compensation in U.S.
dollars or in the equivalent amount in local currency.27' This method of
payment eliminates the problem that arose in the Honduran cases, where
the Court-ordered payment in Honduran currency lost a significant
portion of its purchasing power through a devaluation that occurred
before the Government complied with its payment obligation . 2 More-
over, the Court-ordered compensation is to be free from any form of
27taxation. The Court also generally sets a time limit for payment. It may
do so by specifying an exact date by which the State must pay274 or by
specifying that the State pay within a number of months. The usual time
limit for payment established by the Court has been six months.275 The
Court then supervises compliance with the judgment and maintains the
case on its docket until full compensation is made.276
269. Id. para. 41.
270. Id.
271. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 99 (1993). The
Court has even specified the exchange rate should the State pay in local currency. In that case,
the rate of exchange shall be the "selling rate for the United States Dollar and the Dutch Florin
quoted on the New York market on the day before the date of payment." Id.The European Court of Human Rights generally orders payment in the currency of the
State of the victim. This does not present problems if the value of the currency does not
fluctuate wildly. It will be interesting to note if the European system continues this practice
with the entry of the Eastern European States, some of which do not have such stable
currencies.
272. In the Interpretation of its judgment, the Court ordered the State to pay interest on
the amount owing from the due date and to adjust the amount paid by the government to com-
pensate for the decline in the purchasing power of the currency during the delay in payment
by the government. Godfnez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages
Judgment), 10 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 40-43 (1990).
273. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
para. 57 (1989).
274. In the Aloeboetoe Case, the Court held that Suriname had to pay the compensation
before April 1, 1994. This allowed the State a little over six months from the September 10,
1993 date of judgment. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para.
116 (1993).
275. Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. (1994). In the
Honduran cases, the Court ordered Honduras to pay within ninety dates of notification of
judgment or in six equal monthly installments beginning in ninety days provided that the State
paid interest on the balance. Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) para. 52 (1989); Velfisquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 57 (1989). If the State delays payment past the date set by the
Court, it is obligated to pay interest.
276. Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) res. 5 (1994);
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The Court has adopted a paternalistic role toward child beneficiaries
and uneducated adult beneficiaries who are not accustomed to dealing
with large sums of money. Whereas in Velcsquez Rodriguez, Godinez
Cruz, and Gangaram Panday cases the Court ordered that the State make
payments directly to the adult beneficiaries,277 in Aloeboetoe the Court
permitted the tribal adults to withdraw only twenty-five per cent of the
sum due them immediately upon the State's payment.2 8 The remainder
of the compensation to the adults in Aloeboetoe, and the compensation to
the children in all cases,279 was to be placed in trust.28
The Court prefers to designate payments through a trust, rather than
a bank account, because it has found that trusts are institutions designed
to increase the real value of the assets.28' Furthermore, the Court has not
only ordered the establishment of the trusts, it has even specified many
of their operational details.282 In Aloeboetoe, the Court ordered that the
trust funds be set up in dollars, "under the most favorable conditions
consistent with banking practice., 283 The Court interpreted the term "most
favorable conditions" to mean that "any act or measure by the trustee
must ensure that the amount assigned maintains its purchasing power and
Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 116(6) (1993); Godfnez
Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 55(5) (1989);
Veldisquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 60(5)
(1989).
277. Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 70 (1994);
Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 53 (1989);
Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 58
(1989).
278. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 102 (1993).
279. One possible exception is Gangaram Panday, in which the Court ordered that half
of the nominal compensation awarded be paid to the children "if any." If there were children,
the Court did not set up a trust fund. This may be due to the fairly small amount of the
children's share, which was $5,000. Gangaram Panday Case (Merits), 16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) para. 70 (1994).
280. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 101-02 (1993);
Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 53 (1989);
Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 58
(1989).
281. Godfnez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 10
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 32 (1990); Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Interpretation of the
Compensatory Damages Judgment), 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 32 (1990).
282. In the Aloeboetoe Case, the Court specified that the duration of the trusts for the
adults was to be not less than three years and not more than seventeen years. Aloeboetoe Case(Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 102 (1993). The Court further ordered that
upon the death of any beneficiary, he or she is to be replaced by the heirs. Id. para. 100.
283. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 100 (1993). The
trusts set up for the children in the Honduran cases were also to be operated "under the most
favorable conditions permitted by Honduran banking practice." Velisquez Rodrfguez Case
(Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 58 (1989).
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generates sufficient earnings or dividends to increase it. 284 In further
reflecting on the extent of the fiduciary duty of the trustee to the benefi-
ciaries of the trust, the Court has noted that the "trustee must faithfully
perform his task as would a good head of family.
285
The Inter-American Court has even involved itself in crafting the
administrative structure of the trust funds. In the Aloeboetoe Case, the
Court set up a foundation to administer the trusts and went so far as to
name the foundation members and to oversee the drafting of its statute
and bylaws.286 This paternalistic stance could result in complaints from
beneficiaries who were not given control of their money, if the foundation
trustees named by the Court abuse their fiduciary duties. In the future, it
might be prudent for the Court to consult the beneficiaries as to the
naming of the trustees and to state that fact in the judgment of the Court.
VII. STRUCTURE OF THE PHASES OF THE COURT'S PROCEEDINGS
The Inter-American Court has treated reparations issues
inconsistently, in part by varying the structure of its proceedings.
Although procedurally the Court may determine reparations during the
merits or in a subsequent phase of the proceedings,287 the Court has
allocated some reparations issues to the decision on the merits and some
to the later phase of the proceedings.288 The result has been procedural
284. Godfnez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 10
Inter-Am.. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 31 (1990). The Court clarified that the term "permitted by
Honduran banking practice" meant that the trustee has both the power and the obligation to
diversify investments including the option of depositing the money in stable currencies such
as the dollar. Id.
285. Godfnez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 10
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 31 (1990); Veldsquez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the
Compensatory Damages Judgment), 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) pars. 31 (1990).
286. Aloeboetoe Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 103 (1993). A
meeting was held at which all the members of the Foundation and the Executive Secretary of
the Court defined the organization and drafted its statute and bylaws.
287. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 56, art. 56(1).
288. In the Veldsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases, for instance, the Court treated
aspects of reparations in the judgment on the merits and labeled the subsequent phase
"compensatory damages." In its judgment on the merits, the Court ordered the State to
continue to investigate the violations and to punish the perpetrators. It did not make this order
a part of the resolutiong of the Court on the merits. Furthermore, it did not extend this order
in the damages phase of the proceedings. In its decision on compensatory damages, the Court
stated that such measures "would constitute a part of the reparation of the consequences of the
violation or rights or freedoms and not a part of the indemnity, in accordance with Article
63(1) of the Convention." Godfnez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damages), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) para. 31 (1989); Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) para. 33 (1989). In the Aloeboetoe Case, in which the Government accepted
responsibility, the Court retained the case on its docket to fix "reparations and costs." It later
issued a judgment entitled "reparations" which dealt with more than just financial compensa-
tion. Aloeboetoe Case (Merits), 11 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 23 (1991); Aloeboetoe
Case (Reparations), 15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 116 (1991).
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confusion that could limit Court authority in the future.
The final stage of the Court's proceedings should consistently be
entitled "Reparations (Art. 63(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights)."2' 9 During this reparations stage, the Court should determine all
aspects of reparations, regardless of whether it has dealt with any aspect
of reparations in the judgment on the merits. Such a procedural arrange-
ment will assist the Court in handling the more varied types of human
rights abuses it will likely confront in the future. With living victims
before it, the Court will be able to make fuller use of the authority
conferred on it under the American Convention to order the State to take
remedial measures.29 In such cases the Court will have the opportunity
to order "that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or
freedom that was violated., 291 The Court may also confront cases in
which it may be appropriate to order that certain "consequences of the
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom
be remedied" 292 Although the final phase of the proceedings should
include compensatory damages when appropriate, it should not necessari-
ly be limited to them, unless pecuniary damages are the only reparations
that the Court chooses to order. Even so, as shown above, financial
compensation is one form of reparation. Thus, if the Court orders only
financial damages in a particular case, it would still be correct to identify
that stage of proceedings as "Reparations (Art. 63(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights)."
In the Neira Alegria Case and the El Amparo Case, the Court did not deal with any
aspect of reparations during the merits, but stated that the subsequent stage of proceedings
would deal with compensation and the expenses of the family. In the judgment on the merits
of the Neira Alegria Case, the Court did not refer to the State's duty to further investigate the
violations, determine the whereabouts of the victims, or punish the violators. Moreover, it
stated that the parties had six months to decide on "the form and extent of the compensation
and the reimbursement of the expenditures" incurred by the families of the victims. Neira
Alegria Case (Merits), 20 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 91(4) (1995). See also El Amparo
Case (Merits), 19 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 21 (1995). In the Caballero Delgado Case, the
Court stated in the judgment on the merits that as reparations the State had to punish the
violators. It then held that the subsequent proceeding would fix compensation and reimburse-
ment of expenses. Caballero Delgado and Santana Case (Merits), 22 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) paras. 69 and 72(6) (1995).
289. El Amparo Case (Reparations), - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to
be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4; Neira et al. Case (Reparations), -
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Sept. 14, 1996), to be reprinted in THE 1996 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 4.
290. See Part I supra.
291, American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
292. Id.
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The Court should not appear to be limiting its demands for repara-
tions solely to financial payments.293 Correctly or incorrectly, when only
financial compensation is ordered by the Court in the reparations phase
of the proceedings, without an accompanying directive to investigate the
crime or punish the violators, it may appear that it is sufficient for the
State to remedy its violations if it makes a financial payment. By delin-
eating the final stage of the proceedings as reparations and dealing with
all forms of reparations in that stage, the Court avoids even the appear-
ance of allowing the State to commit human rights violations provided
that it eventually pays the victims or their families.
VIII. THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS ON REPARATIONS
All judgments of the Court are final and not subject to appeal,294 and
the States Parties agree to comply with "any judgment of the Court in a
case to which they are parties. 295 Moreover, any judgment ordering
compensatory damages may be directly executed in the State in accor-
dance with the domestic procedures that govern the execution of judg-
ments against the State.296 If the State does not comply with a judgment
of the Court, the Court shall note the specific instances of noncompliance
and formulate pertinent recommendations in its annual report to the
General Assembly of the OAS.297 The General Assembly may then
discuss the noncompliance and, if desirable, adopt appropriate political
293. In the El Amparo Case, in which Venezuela took responsibility for the deaths of
fourteen fisherman, the Court ignored certain requests for reparations made by the Commis-
sion. It failed to order Venezuela to sanction those responsible for the crime and to consider
whether sections of the Venezuelan Code of Military Justice were incompatible with the
American Convention. The Court merely ordered Venezuela to repair the damages and pay just
compensation to the survivors. El Amparo Case (Merits) 19 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (1995).
Judge Cangado Trindade, a well-known international law scholar, filed a concurring opinion
stating that the Court should have reserved the right to decide on the compatibility of certain
sections of the Venezuelan Military Code with the American Convention. Id. (A. A. Canqado
Trindade, J., concurring).
294. American Convention, supra note 14, art. 67. A party may request the interpretation
of a judgment if the parties disagree as to its meaning or scope. Id.; see, e.g., Godfnez Cruz
Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 10 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)(1990); Veldsquez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 9 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (1990).
295. Id. art. 68(1).
296. Id. art. 68(2). The observer from the European human rights system, in commenting
that the Inter-American Court has "considerably wider powers than the European Court,"
added, "Thirdly, not only do Contracting Parties undertake (as in the European Convention) to
abide by the judgment of the Court (Article 68), but an order for damages will be directly
enforceable in the State concerned (idem)-a provision recalling Articles 187 and 192 of the
Rome treaty." Council of Europe Report, supra note 36, at 81.
297. American Convention, supra note 14, art 65.
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measures against the delinquent country.29 Commenting on this proce-
dure, the European system's observer to the American drafting confer-
ence commented that "the reporting of a state for non-compliance to the
General Assembly, which will be attended by several hundred delegates
and widely publicized, is undoubtedly a procedure which most govern-
ments would prefer to avoid. ' '299 Thus, the Convention foresees the
application of international political pressure to encourage State Parties
to comply with the judgment of the Court.
The Court's attempted use of this procedure to force Honduras to
comply with its judgment' as interpreted in the Veldsquez Rodriguez and
Godinez Cruz cases was unsuccessful, however. Although Honduras had
paid the compensation originally ordered by the Court in these cases,
albeit late, it refused to pay the Court-ordered interest and additional
amount resulting from its failure to pay on time before the devaluation of
its currency. Consequently, the Court included a resolution detailing
Honduras' noncompliance in its yearly report, which it expected to
present to the General Assembly of the OAS. Due to the extensive
lobbying campaign of Honduras, however, this statement was never
officially presented to the General Assembly. Honduras reportedly
threatened to withdraw its acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of
the Court if the General Assembly were to read the Court's condemna-
tion. The General Assembly's refusal to even mildly denounce Honduras
for its failure to fulfill the judgment of the Court limits the Court's
ability to command enforcement of its judgments.3" The application of
international publicity and political pressure on a recalcitrant State can be
298. Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 439, 466-67
(Theodor Meron ed., 1984). This provision was introduced to compensate for the Committee
of Ministers in the European human rights system, which can supervise the execution of a
judgment.
299. Id.
300. The Honduran Government, however, after an extended delay, has fully paid the
compensation ordered by the Court in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Compensatory Damag-
es), 7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (1989) and the Godinez Cruz Case (Compensatory Damag-
es), 8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (seT. C) (1989), including the additional compensation ordered as a
result of the Government's failure to pay in the time provided. Velisquez Cruz Case (Inter-
pretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (seT. C) (1990);
Godfnez Cruz Case (Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment), 10 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (seT. C) (1990). LA TRIBUNA (Tegucigalpa, Honduras), February 8, 1996, Nacionales
Section, at 13 (on file with the author).
Suriname made the initial payment to set up the foundation ordered in the Aloeboetoe
Case, although it is not current on subsequent payments. Victor Manuel Rodrfguez Rescfa,
Eficacla Juridica de la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Inter-Americanos de Derechos Humanos,
in LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANOS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 459, 469 (Rafael
Nieto Navia ed., Corte IDH 1st ed. 1994). Rodrfguez is a staff attorney with the Inter-
American Court.
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an effective means of encouraging the State to comply with its interna-
tional obligations. 30 ' After Honduras' successful campaign to block OAS
efforts to.oversee compliance with Court judgments, other States may
also apply, such pressure, making that avenue untenable.
CONCLUSION
Although complex issues will continue to confront the Inter-Ameri-
can Court in the area of reparations, its rulings to date on these issues
have contributed to the progressive development of international human
rights law. In accordance with its broad statutory authority to order the
State to take remedial measures, as well as provide financial compensa-
tion to the victims of human rights abuses, the Court has declared that
the State must investigate the abuse and, if possible, punish the violators.
In this regard, the Court has also ordered the State to locate the bodies of
disappeared victims and return them to the families. Moreover, the Court
has taken the stance that both victims and indirect victims may receive
moral damages and as such must be compensated for emotional distress,
Furthermore, unlike the European system, all damages owing to deceased
victims are awarded to their beneficiaries. The Inter-American Court has
also taken into consideration the cultural values and social structure of
isolated groups in determining reparations.
In recent years, however, the Court appears to be retreating on some
of these earlier progressive holdings. Although the Court initially .de-
clared that the State was obligated to make full restitution for human
rights violations, it has more recently held that in some cases full resti-
tution may not be appropriate. Moreover, the Court has also limited its
holding that the State must investigate human rights abuses and punish
the violators to what is required under the domestic' law of the State.
This would absolve States that have passed amnesty laws from their
international duty to investigate and punish human rights violations. The
Court also appears to be limiting what should be the reparations phase of
the proceedings to financial compensation only. Should it do so, it will
be abdicating its authority under the American Convention to order the
State to take remedial measures.
301. The case of Nicaragua serves as an example. After a resolution was passed at the OAS
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs condemning the Somoza government's
inhumane conduct with its people, Somoza finally resigned. In doing so, he stated, "What role
do I play when I have the OAS down my neck?" For a complete description and analysis of
these events, see Cerna, Human Rights in Conflict with the Principle of Non-Intervention: The
Case of Nicaragua Before the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, in DERECHOS HUMANOS, DIREITOS HUMANOS, HUMAN RIGHTS EN LAS AMERICAS,
HOMAGE TO THE MEMORY OF CARLOS A. DUNSHEE DC ABRANCHES (OAS 1984).
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Another important problem cannot be handled effectively in the
Inter-American system as it is now structured. In a region which has
been plagued with gross and systematic violations of human rights, there
is no way to compensate more than the families of a few of the victims,
those whose cases actually reach the Inter-American Court. All other
victims and their families remain uncompensated. The system needs
restructuring to deal with this situation.
